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Abstract: Because of the intangible and highly uncertain nature of innovation, 
investors may have difficulty processing information associated with a firm’s 
innovation search strategy. Due to cognitive and strategic biases, investors are 
likely to pay more attention to unfamiliar explorative patents rather than 
incremental exploitative patents. We find that innovative firms focusing on 
exploitation rather than exploration tend to generate superior subsequent short-term 
operating performance. Analysts do not seem to detect this, as firms currently 
focused on exploitation tend to outperform the market’s near-term earnings 
expectations. The stock market also seems unable to accurately incorporate 
information about a firm’s innovation search strategy. We find that firms with 
exploitation strategies are undervalued relative to firms with exploration strategies 
and that this return differential is incremental to standard risk and innovation-based 
pricing factors examined in the prior literature. This result suggests a more nuanced 
view on whether stock market pressure hampers innovation, and may have 
implications for optimal firm financing choices and corporate disclosure policy. 
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1. Introduction 
A firm’s innovative output contains information that is useful in the evaluation of its future 
cash flows. However, because of the intangible and highly uncertain nature of the innovation 
process (Atanassov & Liu, 2019), investors may have difficulty processing this information 
when assessing the value of the firm (Jensen 1993; Cohen, Diether & Malloy, 2013; Hirshleifer, 
Hsu & Li, 2013). This occurs even if a firm patents its inventions, thereby disclosing its 
technology and innovation strategy to the world. 
Here we ask whether investors can accurately value the innovation search strategy of a firm, 
characterizing this strategy as a choice between the exploration of new capabilities and the 
exploitation of a firm’s extant competencies (March, 1991; Manso, 2011). Firms following an 
exploration strategy seek novel technologies and approaches that are new to the firm while 
those following an exploitation strategy, in contrast, “stick to their knitting” and refine currently 
successful and previously patented approaches. Exploration requires search that is distant from 
the firm’s current knowledge and capabilities while exploitation relies on local search of a 
firm’s existing competencies.  
 Many studies show that, due to limited investor attention, prices do not fully incorporate 
all available information (e.g. Klibanof, Lamont & Wizman, 1998; Huberman & Regev, 2001; 
Barber & Odean, 2008; Cohen & Frazzini, 2008; Dellavigna & Pollet, 2009; Hirshleifer, Lin, 
& Teoh, 2009; Hou, Peng & Xiong, 2009; Da, Engelberg & Gao, 2011; Da, Gurun & Warachka, 
2011; Da & Warachka, 2011; Cohen & Lou, 2012; Li & Yu, 2012).  Recent work has illustrated 
this challenge for predicting the impact of innovation information in the form of patent grants 
(Hirshleifer et al., 2013; Cohen et al., 2013); here we propose two specific mechanisms that 
could lead investors to under value exploitation strategies. The first mechanism is cognitive; 
investors could display an inherent psychological bias towards interpreting salient information. 
The second mechanism is strategic; firms could direct investor attention towards significant 
technological advances, particularly if those advances occur outside of a firm’s previously 
known research trajectory. 
The psychology literature has historically suggested that people focus on salient and vivid 
information, especially when facing complex problems (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Song & 
Schwartz, 2010). More recent neuroscience research has established a consistent preference for 
novelty when processing information and shown that the neurological structures of novelty 
recognition and reward are linked (Bunzeck, Guitart-Masip, Dolan & Duzel, 2011). Expected 
novelty is also remembered more strongly (Wittmann, Bunzeck, Dolan & Duzel, 2007). In 
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contrast, investors may devote insufficient time to understanding the incremental economic 
significance of additional patents granted in technological areas that the firm and its investors 
are already familiar with. By definition, breakthroughs and new trajectories are rare, making it 
easier to focus on them, particularly in a complex and uncertain environment.  As a result, 
investors may overlook the potentially significant value generated by typically more process-
oriented and incremental patents in order to focus on different and more exciting inventions 
(Banbury & Mitchell, 1995; Hult, 2014). In other words, investors may ignore patents which 
fill in and solidify a previously known research trajectory in favor of patents which open up 
new trajectories.1 
Independent of investors’ cognitive processes, innovative firms and their managers are also 
more likely to publicize the granting of patents that are considerably different from the firm’s 
current patent portfolio (Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru & Stoffman, 2017). Assuming that firms 
are not trying to hide their innovative successes, firm executives may have multiple incentives 
to prefer the reporting of patenting in a new technology area, relative to additional patents in a 
previously patented area.  
First, it is plausible that company executives will place greater emphasis on highlighting a 
firm’s exploratory innovative activities in order to establish their reputation in the popular press 
as a ‘pioneer’ or ‘radical innovator.’ In the likely event that exploratory innovation activities 
will attract greater media coverage of both the firm and its key executives (Raimondo, 2019; 
Ahern & Sosyura, 2015), studies such as Nyugen (2015) and Kuhnen & Niessen (2012) suggest 
that corporate executives are likely to derive both monetary and other private benefits from this 
increased media attention. Therefore, consistent with the reporting obligations of publicly 
traded firms to disclose significant changes in their technological focus and/or operations in 
their regulatory filings, it is probable that firm managers will be more inclined to emphasize 
major changes in the technological focus of a firm’s innovative activities in their press/10-K 
releases so as to educate investors on the success of the management team’s long-term growth 
strategy.2 In addition to fulfilling legal requirements, such announcements are usually intended 
to buoy investor confidence and stock prices (relative, for example, to the second, third, or 
fourth patent in a developing area).  
                                                          
1 This mechanism is analogous to behavioral explanations of the value premium (see e.g. Lakonishok, Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1994), according to which “growth/glamour” stocks are overvalued because investors focus too much 
attention on these firms and become over-excited about their future earnings growth (Hong & Stein, 2007). 
2 The firm is even more likely to publicize such grants if it has an explicit diversification strategy, as patent grants 
in fields not previously patented in are credible initial evidence that the firm’s diversification strategy is working. 
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Relatedly, it is also possible that a company’s current managers (particularly more recent 
appointees) may believe that investors will give the current management team insufficient credit 
for their individual skill and efforts if they are perceived to be simply following the firm’s 
preordained innovation trajectory (Warren & Sorescu, 2017). As a result, corporate managers 
may use a firm’s exploratory innovative activities as an opportunity to emphasize the specific 
contribution of the current management team to overall firm value.3  
Thus, the relatively lower amount of information provided by firms about the future 
implications of their exploitative activities may further compound the effect of investors’ 
existing bias towards understanding a firm’s relatively different or unusual inventions.  
These two consistent mechanisms imply that investors will pay more attention to 
explorative patents than exploitative patents. Therefore, we expect that information about firms 
engaged in exploration will be quickly incorporated into prices, while information about firms 
engaged in exploitation takes time to be incorporated into prices. We are thus more likely to 
find return predictability among stocks that focus on exploitation.  
In order to test our conjectures, we first develop two alternative measures that distinguish 
whether a firm in any given year is relatively more focused on exploitation of the firm’s existing 
known technologies versus exploration of newer technologies. First, we introduce a new 
measure called Internal Search Proximity which examines the degree of overlap in terms of 
technology classes between patents granted to the firm in year 𝑡𝑡 and the existing patent portfolio 
held by the same firm up to year 𝑡𝑡 − 1. A firm that focuses on exploitation will have substantial 
overlap in technology classes, while a firm that focuses on exploration will have relatively little 
overlap in technology classes. Second, we adapt the “explorative” patent definition developed 
by the recent innovation literature that classifies patents as being exploratory in nature if the 
majority of the patents it cites as prior art represent new knowledge to the firm. We use this to 
develop a firm’s Exploitative Patent Ratio which classifies firms as being focused on 
exploration/(exploitation) if a relatively greater/(lesser) proportion of their newly granted 
patents utilize new knowledge sources. As a result, both Internal Search Proximity and 
Exploitative Patent Ratio will be our measures of exploitation search focus. Firms pursuing an 
exploitation-focused innovation strategy are associated with high exploitation search focus 
measures. 
                                                          
3 This is analogous to the phenomenon of new CEOs seeking to “place their stamp” on the business by divesting 
poorly performing acquisitions made by the prior management team (Weisbach, 1995).    
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We then examine whether differences in firm innovative search focus contains predictive 
information about a firm’s future profitability and operating cash flows. We conduct annual 
Fama & Macbeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions of an individual firm’s future profitability, 
defined as either one year-ahead return on assets (ROA) or one year-ahead operating cash flow 
(OCF), on a firm’s exploitation search focus score as well as a vector of other control variables. 
We find a significantly positive relationship between a firm’s exploitation search focus and 
future ROA and OCF in all specifications. Specifically, we find that high exploitation firms 
tend to generate superior subsequent operating performance (at least in the near to intermediate 
term) relative to high exploration firms. 
We next investigate the extent to which the market accurately incorporates any such 
predictability into its earnings expectations, using consensus analyst forecasts as proxies for 
market expectations. If the market fails to fully understand the positive impact of exploitative 
patents on future firm profitability, then we might observe more positive “earnings surprises” 
for exploitation-focused firms which may in turn result in these firms generating abnormally 
high future stock returns. We conduct quarterly Fama & Macbeth (1973) cross-sectional 
regressions of realized earnings surprise in each of the four quarters in year 𝑡𝑡+1 on the level of 
exploitation search focus in year 𝑡𝑡 and other firm-specific control variables. Interestingly, we 
find that firms currently focused on exploitation tend to significantly outperform the market’s 
near-term earnings expectations. This implies that high exploitation firms not only tend to 
generate superior subsequent operating performance relative to high exploration firms but that 
the market does not seem to fully factor the positive economic value generated by exploitative 
patents into its earnings expectations for these firms. As such, we identify a potential channel 
through which certain innovative firms may be systematically undervalued by the market. 
We then examine whether the direction of a firm’s innovative search efforts systematically 
predicts future stock returns. Using a portfolio sort methodology, we find that firms with high 
exploitation search focus scores (high exploitation firms) are undervalued relative to high 
exploration firms and that this return differential is incremental to standard risk and innovation-
based pricing factors examined in the prior literature. Using Fama & Macbeth (1973) cross-
sectional regressions, we confirm that the return predictive ability of our exploitation search 
focus measures is distinct from and robust to the inclusion of industry fixed effects as well as 
other commonly used firm-level return predictors and innovation-based variables.  
Finally, in support of our conjecture that investor inattention drives our return predictability 
results, we find that the positive exploitation-future stock return relationship is stronger 
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amongst groups of firms with a relatively higher proportion of inattentive investors (using both 
advertising intensity and transient institutional investors as proxies). Furthermore, we also find 
that the addition of future earnings surprises to our list of stock return predictors significantly 
attenuates the relationship between exploitation search focus and future stock returns. This 
implies that a large amount of the observed return predictability appears to be driven by 
investors and equity analysts failing to fully incorporate the beneficial impact of exploitative 
innovation into their initial earnings forecasts and subsequently observing exploitative firms 
exceed these initial earnings projections, resulting in abnormally high stock returns for 
exploitation-focused innovative firms. 
To exemplify the theory and mechanisms underlying our hypothesis development and 
empirical results, we present the case study of Andrx Corporation in Appendix 1. The Andrx 
Corporation case illustrates in detail how limited investor attention resulted in the market failing 
to fully appreciate the positive impact of the firm’s exploitative drug delivery patents on future 
firm profitability, leading to many years of positive “earnings surprises” and abnormally high 
future stock returns for this exploitation-focused firm. 
It is a widely held view that stock market pressure hampers innovation (Stein, 1989; 
Ferreira, Manso & Silva, 2013), for example, through the impact of short-term earnings 
pressures. Our results provide a more nuanced view, as the stock market effect on innovation 
depends on the type of innovation.  If as we show markets underestimate the significant value 
generated by exploitative innovation, then exploratory innovation rather than exploitative 
innovation becomes more attractive to firms, conditional on the amount of resources allocated 
to research and development.  The lower cost of capital associated with exploration makes it 
more attractive for firms to pursue this type of innovation when compared to exploitation (see 
generally Levinthal & March, 1981; Levinthal & March, 1993). 
Our earnings surprise and return predictability results also have implications for optimal 
firm financing policy and corporate disclosure policy in relation to a firm’s innovative activities. 
With respect to firm financing policy, the undervaluation of high exploitation firms relative to 
high exploration firms by public equity markets will likely drive managers of exploitation-
focused firms to strongly prefer the use of cash and debt to fund the firm’s innovative 
investments. With respect to corporate disclosure policy, our results emphasize the need for 
firms pursuing an exploitative innovation search strategy to provide greater investor guidance 
as to the beneficial earnings impact, particularly in the short-term, of exploitative patents.  
 
 
7 
 
Our study contributes to the growing literature on the relationship between corporate 
innovative activities and financial markets. In particular, we introduce two new patent-based 
measures to capture the theoretical distinction between ‘exploration’ and ‘exploitation’ in 
corporate innovation search strategy (March, 1991; Manso, 2011). Our results expand on the 
recent findings that investors tend to undervalue firms that: (a) invest heavily in R&D and have 
exhibited historical success in converting R&D investment into sales (Cohen et al., 2013); (b) 
are efficient in translating R&D expenditure into future patents (Hirshleifer et al., 2013) and (c) 
produce patents that are relatively more “original” compared to all other patented innovation, 
proxied by the diversity of technology classes cited (Hirshleifer, Hsu & Li, 2018). While these 
papers illustrate investors’ difficulty in comparing distinct firms across various innovation 
metrics, such as historical capacity or the originality of their patents, our findings highlight the 
added difficulty that investors face when interpreting the incremental economic significance of 
a firm’s current innovative output relative to the past innovative output of the same firm. 
Building on recent literature, we argue that the trade-off between exploration and 
exploitation that firms face is theoretically and empirically distinct from whether firms patent 
a relatively original or unoriginal innovation. Firms may patent a highly original/(unoriginal) 
innovation while following existing/(new) research trajectories and vice versa, which is 
probably why we observe very low correlations between our Exploitation Search Focus 
measures and previously studied innovation-related measures such as innovative efficiency 
(Hirshleifer et al., 2013) and innovative originality (Hirshleifer et al., 2018). We find that 
investors tend to overlook the potentially significant value generated by exploitative patents 
that build on the firm’s existing knowledge base. This is not inconsistent with an undervaluation 
of original patents, as it is might well be those original technological advances that are exploited 
to appropriate the full value of an invention. Our findings suggest that exploration and 
originality are distinct concepts of a more nuanced view on innovation, and that an individual 
firm’s internal focus on exploitative versus exploratory innovation contains independent value-
relevant information that are more effective than the market would expect. 
 
2. Data and sample description 
We discuss this study’s data sources in Section 2.1 while in Section 2.2 we outline the 
construction of our two empirical measures used to classify firms as having a relatively greater 
focus on exploitative or explorative innovation. We present key summary statistics and variable 
correlations in Section 2.3. 
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2.1 Data sources 
Our empirical analysis is based on the joint availability of firm level data for publicly traded 
U.S. firms in the Compustat, CRSP (Center for Research in Security Prices) and NBER patent 
databases. We use stock return data from CRSP and obtain accounting data from Compustat. 
Our initial sample consists of all domestic common shares trading on the NYSE, AMEX or 
NASDAQ with sufficient accounting and returns data, excluding firms with negative book 
value of equity and financial firms with four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes 
between 6000 and 6999. Following Fama & French (1993), we exclude closed-end funds, trusts, 
American Depositary Receipts (ADRs), real estate investment trusts and units of beneficial 
interest. Following Hirshleifer et al. (2013), we require firms to be listed in Compustat for two 
years before including them in our sample in order to mitigate backfilling bias. 
Patent-related data is sourced from both the NBER patent database, originally developed by 
Hall, Jaffe & Trajtenberg (2001), as well as the Fung Institute’s public patent database at the 
University of California, Berkeley (Balsmeier, Fleming & Manso, 2017; Balsmeier et al., 2018). 
The NBER patent database contains various details on all U.S. patents granted by the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) between January 1976 and December 2006, including 
patent assignee identifiers that facilitate the matching of USPTO patent information with firm 
level data contained in the Compustat and CRSP databases. The information in the NBER 
database is then supplemented with technology class data from the Fung Institute’s database. 
As discussed more extensively below, since many of the patent-based variables employed by 
this study require the examination of at least five years of historical patent information for each 
sample year, our sample period begins in 1981 and ends in 2006. For some of our tests, we also 
obtain institutional ownership data from the Thomson Reuters Institutional (13F) Holdings 
database and analyst estimates data from the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S). 
2.2 Patent-based measures of exploitation search focus 
In order to distinguish firms in any given year based on their relative focus on exploitation 
of existing known technologies versus exploration of newer technologies (otherwise referred to 
as a firm’s level of exploitation search focus), we use two alternative empirical measures that 
draw on two distinct sources of patent-level information.  
First, we develop a novel measure Internal Search Proximity which examines the degree of 
overlap between patents granted to the firm in year 𝑡𝑡 and the existing patent portfolio held by 
the same firm up to year 𝑡𝑡 − 1. In particular, we employ the following variant of the Jaffe (1989) 
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technological proximity measure to estimate the “closeness” in technological space of firm 𝑖𝑖’s 
new patents in year 𝑡𝑡 (patent flow 𝑓𝑓) and its depreciation-adjusted4 pre-existing patent stock 𝑔𝑔 
at year 𝑡𝑡 − 1 using patent counts in different USPTO three-digit technology classes 𝑘𝑘: 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆ℎ 𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = ∑ 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡−1𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1
�∑ 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡2𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1 �12�∑ 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡−12𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1 �12   (1) 
where 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡 is the fraction of patents granted to firm 𝑖𝑖 in year 𝑡𝑡 that are in technology class 𝑘𝑘 
such that the vector 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = �𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖,1,𝑡𝑡 … 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖,𝐾𝐾,𝑡𝑡� locates the firm’s year 𝑡𝑡 patenting activity in 𝐾𝐾-
dimensional technology space and 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡−1 is the fraction of all patents granted to firm 𝑖𝑖 up to 
(and including) year 𝑡𝑡 − 1 that are in technology class 𝑘𝑘 such that vector 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 =
�𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,1,𝑡𝑡−1 …𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝐾𝐾,𝑡𝑡−1� locates the firm’s patent stock in 𝐾𝐾-dimensional technology space.5 
Internal Search Proximity will be zero for a given firm year when there is no overlap in a firm’s 
innovative output in year 𝑡𝑡 with the firm’s patent stock at time 𝑡𝑡 − 1 while Internal Search 
Proximity will equal one when the technology class distribution of firm 𝑖𝑖’s patents granted this 
year is identical to that of patents accumulated in previous years. Therefore, we classify firms 
as being relatively more focused on exploration/(exploitation) when they have low/(high) 
values of Internal Search Proximity. 
Second, to further enhance and validate the robustness of our identification of firms 
pursuing exploitative versus explorative innovative search strategies, we adopt an alternative 
measure used in many recent innovation-related studies such as Ma (2018), Brav, Jiang, Ma & 
Tian (2018), Gao, Hsu & Li (2018) and Lin, Liu & Manso (2017). Specifically, we define the 
“new cite ratio” and “explorativeness” as measures of the percentage of new knowledge used 
in a firm’s current innovative output. New knowledge is identified by patent citations to patents 
that have not been previously developed or cited by the firm. In particular, we first define firm 
𝑖𝑖’s existing knowledge in year 𝑡𝑡 as all patents either produced by firm 𝑖𝑖 or that were cited by 
firm 𝑖𝑖’s patents up to year 𝑡𝑡 − 1. The “new cite ratio” of a patent is calculated as the total 
number of citations made to new knowledge divided by the total number of citations made by 
the patent. Following Benner & Tushman (2002), a patent is flagged as “explorative” if at least 
                                                          
4 Following studies such as Hall, Jaffe & Trajtenberg (2005), we apply a 15% depreciation rate to a firm’s past 
patent stock when calculating our Internal Search Proximity measure. Our results are almost identical if we use a 
0% or 20% depreciation rate instead.  
5 When computing Internal Search Proximity measures for each firm, we only use patents initially granted to the 
firm itself (since these patents are internally generated based on the firm’s R&D activities). In robustness tests, 
we also include patents acquired by the firm in our calculations and find qualitatively similar results. 
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80% of its citations are based on new knowledge (new cite ratio ≥ 80%).6 We can then 
transform these patent-level measures to the firm-year level by creating the “explorative patent 
ratio”, defined as the total number of firm 𝑖𝑖’s patents granted in year 𝑡𝑡 that are classed as 
“explorative” divided by the total number of patents granted to firm 𝑖𝑖 in year 𝑡𝑡. We can use the 
“explorative patent ratio” to create its corollary the Exploitative Patent Ratio, defined as one 
minus firm 𝑖𝑖’s “explorative patent ratio” in year 𝑡𝑡. As a result, we classify firms as being 
relatively more focused on exploration/(exploitation) when they have a low/(high) value for 
their Exploitative Patent Ratio. 
One particularly notable aspect of our exploitation search focus measures is that, in order 
to assess the direction of a firm’s dynamic innovative search strategy over time, we need 
information about both the firm’s current and past innovative activities. For example, for our 
Internal Search Proximity measure, we can only identify firms as being relatively more focused 
on exploration or exploitation by knowing about the technological classes in which the firm has 
previously been patenting. Similarly, we can only classify firms who are relatively more 
focused on exploiting existing knowledge as opposed to exploring new knowledge using the 
Exploitative Patent Ratio once we identify the focal firm’s set of “existing knowledge.” As a 
result, we only include firms that are granted at least one new patent in year 𝑡𝑡 in our subsequent 
analysis.  
Although this requirement results in a smaller overall sample compared to some other 
innovation-related studies,7 our goal of identifying a firm’s potentially dynamic innovation 
strategy means that we require access to objective patent-based information about a firm’s 
current and past innovative activities. Furthermore, we believe that restricting research attention 
to the sample of more actively patenting firms who are more focused on conducting innovative 
activities as part of their core business operations is beneficial for interpreting our results and 
understanding the nature of the relationship between innovation search strategies and public 
equity markets. For example, we avoid imposing strong assumptions about whether firms with 
no current patents are engaged in explorative or exploitative innovation search strategies in the 
pursuit of obtaining the maximum possible sample size. Combined with the fact that our focus 
on actively patenting firms still results in our study examining publicly traded U.S. companies 
who comprise over 50% of total U.S. market equity (comparable to the 55% of total U.S. market 
                                                          
6 We also conduct robustness tests whereby we either sort firms on their average new cite ratio or use alternative 
thresholds for identifying a patent as being “explorative” and obtain similar empirical results. 
7 For example, Hirshleifer et al. (2018) calculate their firm-year innovative originality measure using an average 
of all patents granted to the firm over the previous five years.  
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equity covered by the innovative efficiency measures in Hirshleifer et al., 2013) and the fact 
that we use two alternative measures (Internal Search Proximity and Exploitative Patent Ratio) 
that rely on two distinct sources of patent-based information (patent technology class and patent 
back citations, respectively) to classify firms as being relatively more focused on exploitation 
or exploration, we believe that our results robustly identify the relationship between firm 
innovative search strategy and stock market valuations as well as demonstrate a high level of 
economic relevance. 
2.3 Sample composition and summary statistics 
Table 1 reports summary statistics of the three exploitation search focus portfolios (based 
on Internal Search Proximity or Exploitative Patent Ratio) and the correlation between a firm’s 
exploitation search focus measure and other firm characteristics. In particular, we form three 
portfolios at the end of June of year 𝑡𝑡 based on the 30th and 70th percentiles of firm exploitative 
search focus scores measured in year 𝑡𝑡 − 1.  
Panel A reports the average annual number of firms in each portfolio and the median value 
of various firm characteristics within these portfolios, where all characteristics are for the year 
prior to the ranking year except for size, momentum, illiquidity, idiosyncratic volatility and 
total skewness (which are measured at the end of June of the ranking year). These characteristics 
include Size (measured as the natural log of market capitalization), the year-end book-to-market 
equity ratio (BTM), Momentum (calculated as the prior six month stock return with a one month 
gap between the holding period and the current month following Hou, Peng & Xiong, 2009), 
Patents (defined as patents granted in year 𝑡𝑡 − 1 divided by lagged total assets), Capex 
(calculated as capital expenditure divided by lagged total assets), R&D (measured as R&D 
expenditures scaled by lagged total assets), Firm Age (computed as the number of years that a 
firm is listed on Compustat), Conglomerate (defined as a dummy variable that is equal to one 
when a firm has segments with positive assets and sales in more than one 3-digit SIC code 
industry during the year following Gopalan & Xie (2011), Total Patent Stock (calculated as the 
number of all patents granted to the firm up to year 𝑡𝑡 − 1 scaled by lagged total assets), 
Advertising (computed as advertising expense scaled by lagged assets per Grullon, Kanatas & 
Weston, 2004; Lou, 2014), SG&A is selling, general and administrative expenses divided by 
lagged total assets following Eisfeldt & Papanikolaou, 2013), Illiquidity (defined as the absolute 
monthly stock return divided by monthly dollar trading volume in June of year 𝑡𝑡 as in Amihud, 
2002), Leverage (equal to total debt divided by total assets), net stock issues (NS, defined as the 
change in the natural log of split-adjusted shares outstanding in year 𝑡𝑡 − 1), institutional 
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ownership (Inst. Own, calculated as the fraction of firm shares held by institutional investors), 
idiosyncratic volatility (IV, measured at the end of June of year 𝑡𝑡 as the standard deviation of 
the residuals from regressing daily stock returns on the Fama-French three factor returns over 
the previous 12 months following Hirshleifer et al., 2018), total skewness (SKEW, calculated at 
the end of June of year 𝑡𝑡 using daily stock returns over the previous 12 months), innovative 
efficiency (IE, defined as adjusted patent citations scaled by R&D expenses per Hirshleifer et 
al., 2013) and innovative originality (IO, defined as the average score of a firm’s patents’ 
originality scores, where originality is the number of unique technological classes (both primary 
and secondary classes) assigned to the patents cited by the focal patent over the past five years 
following Hirshleifer et al., 2018). 
For example, across the 306, 406 and 306 firms that are on average in the low, middle and 
high exploitation search focus portfolios each year (based on Internal Search Proximity) 
respectively, the median market capitalization of firms in each portfolio is $146 million, $411 
million and $530 million respectively. As such, our sample is concentrated in relatively larger 
firms that comprise an economically meaningful 50% of total US market equity. Furthermore, 
there is significant variation in the exploitation search focus measures across the various 
portfolios. In particular, the median exploitation search focus measure in the low group based 
on Internal Search Proximity and Exploitative Patent Ratio is zero in both cases while the 
median value in the high group is 0.94 and 0.88 respectively (the standard deviation for our 
Internal Search Proximity and Exploitative Patent Ratio measures are 0.35 and 0.37 
respectively). We also find that firms with higher exploitation search focus scores have higher 
R&D intensity, higher innovative efficiency and a higher patent-to-total assets ratio. 
Interestingly, there is some evidence to suggest that there exists a positive univariate 
relationship between a firm’s current focus on exploitation and future operating performance. 
In particular, the high exploitation search focus portfolio exhibits a higher return on assets 
(measured as income before extraordinary items plus interest expenses scaled by lagged total 
assets) and higher operating cash flow (calculated as income before extraordinary items plus 
depreciation and minus changes in working capital scaled by lagged total assets) in the year 
following portfolio formation. We examine this relationship in greater detail in Section 3. 
In Panel B of Table 1 we report the pairwise Pearson correlation coefficients among our 
exploitation search focus measures and other firm characteristics. In general, our two 
exploitation search focus measures do not strongly correlate with the firm characteristics shown 
in Panel A, ranging from -0.13 with BTM to 0.13 with size. However, there is very strong 
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positive correlation of 0.51 between Internal Search Proximity and Exploitative Patent Ratio 
despite the fact that the two measures are constructed using two quite distinct sources of patent-
level information (a patent’s designated primary technology class and the back citations made 
by a particular patent respectively). The fact that one can use two distinct sources of information 
about individual patents to construct firm-level patent portfolio measures that reach a similar 
conclusion about whether a firm is pursuing an exploitation or exploration innovative search 
strategy provides additional comfort as to the robustness of our approach to classifying firms 
based on their innovative search strategies. 
The correlation of the two exploitation search focus measures with previously used 
measures IE and IO is relatively low with Internal Search Proximity having a correlation with 
IE and IO of 0.02 and -0.01, respectively; Exploitative Patent Ratio has a correlation with IE 
and IO of 0.03 and 0.10, respectively. This indicates that our measures for distinguishing firms’ 
relative focus on exploitation versus exploration remain distinct from other previously 
examined innovation-based return predictors and thus have the potential to contain independent 
value-relevant information. For example, a firm’s patent portfolio may have a high innovative 
originality score and still be following an exploitative innovation search strategy because the 
citations made by the firm’s current patents are to its own existing stock of patents and/or prior 
knowledge. Similarly, a firm with a low originality score in a given year may well be pursuing 
an explorative search strategy through the acquisition of new knowledge contained in patents 
not previously worked on or utilized by the firm’s inventors and by patenting in new technology 
classes. These exploration strategies could be orthogonal to the diversity of technology class 
assignment (as reflected in IO, which counts the number of USPTO classes that are assigned to 
a patent).  In unreported analysis (available upon request), we find that the commonly used 
“innovative originality” measure developed by Hall et al. (2001) does not load on either the 
‘exploitation’ or ‘exploration’ component in a principal components analysis, further indicating 
the distinctiveness of our exploitation search focus measures from innovation-related variables 
studied in the prior literature. Nevertheless, for robustness purposes, we include both IE and IO 
as controls in all subsequent analysis and we find that both of our exploitation search focus 
measures continue to contain meaningfully incremental value-relevant information. 
3. Exploitation search focus and future operating performance 
We first examine whether differences in firm innovative search focus contains predictive 
information about a firm’s future profitability and cash flows. We then investigate the extent to 
which the market accurately incorporates any such predictability into its earnings forecasts.  
 
 
14 
 
3.1. Exploitation search focus and future operating performance 
Following Fama & French (2000), we conduct the following annual Fama & Macbeth 
(1973) cross-sectional regressions of an individual firm’s future profitability, defined as either 
one year-ahead return on assets (ROA) or one year-ahead operating cash flow (OCF), on a 
firm’s exploitation search focus score as well as a vector of other control variables (𝑋𝑋): 
𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆ℎ 𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + ∑ 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡48𝑗𝑗=1       (2) 
Following the prior literature, we include a variety of control variables that have been found to 
be significant predictors of future operating performance. We first control for current firm 
profitability to accommodate the documented persistence in operating performance (Gu, 2005) 
as well as the change in firm profitability in order to account for mean reversion in future 
operating performance (Fama & French, 2000). We also follow Pandit, Wasley & Zach (2011) 
and control for the current levels of R&D expenditure, patenting, capital expenditure and 
market-to-book assets. Our regressions also control for leverage, firm age, an indicator variable 
for whether the firm is a conglomerate and the total patent stock held by a firm, as well as the 
current level of advertising and selling, general and administrative expenditures. We also 
include innovative efficiency (Hirshleifer et al., 2013) and innovative originality (Hirshleifer et 
al., 2018) as controls to facilitate comparison with prior innovation-based return predictors. All 
regressions include Fama & French (1997) 48 industry fixed effects while all variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% level to mitigate the effect of outliers (Beaver & Ryan, 2000). 
Following Hirshleifer et al. (2013), we also standardize all independent variables to zero mean 
and one standard deviation.  
Table 2 reports the time series average slopes and intercepts as well as the corresponding t-
statistics (which incorporate a Newey-West correction with 12 lags to account for possible 
autocorrelation in the coefficient estimates) from the annual cross-sectional regressions 
specified in equation (2). We first observe that there exists a significantly positive relationship 
between a firm’s exploitative search focus and future ROA and OCF in all specifications. For 
example, a one standard deviation increase in a firm’s Internal Search Proximity (where higher 
values are interpreted as exhibiting a greater focus on exploitation) results in 0.45% (0.49%) 
increase in subsequent year ROA (OCF). As expected, the significantly positive (negative) 
coefficient on prior year operating performance (change in operating performance) confirms 
the existence of both persistence and mean reversion in firm operating performance. We also 
find that capital expenditure (CapEx) and Firm Age is positively correlated with subsequent 
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ROA and OCF, indicating that greater accumulated tangible investment helps to drive future 
profitability. Consistent with the findings in Hirshleifer et al. (2013), we observe that innovative 
efficiency (IE) has a positive association with subsequent OCF while R&D has a significantly 
negative relationship with next year’s operating performance measures, potentially reflecting 
the long-term and uncertain payoffs associated with R&D investments.   
3.2. Earnings surprise and exploitation search focus 
While the evidence in the preceding section suggests that innovative firms that are focused 
on the exploitation of their existing technologies (namely firms with high exploitation search 
focus scores) exhibit better subsequent operating performance, it is important to consider 
whether the market accurately incorporates this information into its earnings forecasts. On the 
one hand, it is possible that the operating outperformance of exploitation firms documented in 
the previous section simply reflects fundamental differences in the expected timing of returns 
for exploitative versus exploratory innovation that is efficiently incorporated into the market’s 
future earnings projections (see generally Fitzgerald, Gray, Hall & Jeyaraj, 2013; Asquith, 
Mikhail & Au, 2005). Conversely, if the market fails to fully understand the positive impact of 
exploitative patents on future firm profitability, then we might observe more positive “earnings 
surprises” for exploitation-focused firms which may in turn result in these firms generating 
abnormally high future stock returns. 
Consider the case of U.S. drug delivery firm Andrx Corporation discussed in Appendix 1. 
In this case study, we directly quote the research reports of equity analysts covering Andrx who 
admit that they initially underestimated the potential profits that Andrx could generate from its 
strategy of exploiting its existing innovative capabilities to improve the release profile of legacy 
drugs. As a result, Andrx’s actual earnings per share (EPS) substantially exceeded consensus 
EPS estimates for over two years, leading to a fivefold increase in Andrx’s share price as the 
market updated its valuation of Andrx’s exploitation strategy.  
To formally test this earnings surprise channel, we follow So (2013) and define realized 
quarterly earnings surprises as the difference between actual EPS and the prevailing consensus 
EPS forecast, scaled by total assets per share. We proxy for the earnings expectations of all 
investors using the consensus analyst forecast from I/B/E/S. The consensus forecast is defined 
as the mean EPS forecast amongst all equity analysts that make a forecast in the last month 
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prior to the earnings announcement (Dellavigna & Pollet, 2009).8 The sample period for this 
particular empirical test only spans 1983 to 2006 because the I/B/E/S database only started 
systematically recording quarterly EPS forecasts from the beginning of fiscal year 1983. 
To examine the multivariate relationship between a firm’s exploitation search focus and 
future earnings surprises, we conduct quarterly Fama-Macbeth cross-sectional regressions of 
realized earnings surprises in each of the four quarters in year 𝑡𝑡+1 on exploitation search focus 
in year 𝑡𝑡 and other firm-specific control variables. We initially control for the following firm-
specific characteristics: last quarter’s realized earnings surprise for firm 𝑖𝑖 (Lagged ES) and the 
change in earnings surprise between the prior two quarters (∆ES) to account for the persistence 
and mean reversion in future firm profitability (So, 2013), Accruals (defined as total accruals 
in year 𝑡𝑡 scaled by lagged total assets following Sloan, 1996), return on assets (ROA) and an 
indicator for whether the consensus analyst EPS forecast for that quarter is negative (negative 
EPS) per Fama & French (2006). In subsequent specifications we also control for BTM, 
Momentum (defined as the prior six month returns prior to the relevant earnings announcement), 
R&D, CapEx, Patents, Leverage, Firm Age, Conglomerate, Total Patent Stock, Advertising and 
SG&A. We also include innovative efficiency (Hirshleifer et al., 2013) and innovative 
originality (Hirshleifer et al., 2018) as further controls. All regressions include Fama-French 48 
industry fixed effects while all variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level and 
standardized to have zero mean and standard deviation of one. 
Table 3 presents the results of these regressions. Most notably, the significantly positive 
coefficient on exploitation search focus using either Internal Search Proximity or Exploitative 
Patent Ratio indicates that firms currently focused on exploitation tend to outperform the 
market’s near-term earnings expectations. In particular, high exploitation firms on average 
generate “unexpected” positive income in year 𝑡𝑡+1 equal to approximately 12 basis points of 
total firm assets. Alternatively stated, this implies that the average firm in our sample generates 
profits that are 3% higher than market expectations in year 𝑡𝑡+1 for each one standard deviation 
increase in its exploitation search focus score.  
In sum, the evidence in this section implies that high exploitation firms not only tend to 
generate superior near-term operating performance relative to high exploration firms but that 
                                                          
8 If an individual analyst makes multiple forecasts prior to a firm’s earnings release, we only use the most recent 
forecast. Our results are qualitatively similar if we use the median forecast as the consensus forecast measure. 
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the market does not seem to fully factor the economic value generated by exploitative patents 
into its near-term earnings expectations for these innovative companies. 
 
4. Predictability of returns based on innovative search focus 
Given the documented positive relationship between a firm’s relatively greater focus on 
exploitation innovation and future operating performance as well as the evidence that 
sophisticated equity market analysts (and likely a significant fraction of institutional investors) 
appear to underestimate the near-term profit potential of exploitative patents, we next examine 
whether the direction of a firm’s innovative search efforts systematically predicts stock returns 
using both portfolio sort and regression methodologies. 
4.1. Portfolio tests 
In this subsection, we examine the ability of the estimated direction of a firm’s innovative 
search activities to predict portfolio returns. At the end of June of year 𝑡𝑡, we sort firms 
independently into two size groups (small “S” or big “B”) based on the NYSE median size 
breakpoint and three groups for each innovative search dimension (low “L”, middle “M” and 
high “H”) based on the 30th and 70th percentiles of firms’ exploitation search focus scores. 
Following Hirshleifer et al. (2013), we perform our portfolio allocations using either a firm’s 
Internal Search Proximity or Exploitative Patent Ratio score in the year 𝑡𝑡 − 1 while defining 
size as the market value of equity at the end of June of year 𝑡𝑡. This intersection forms 6 size-
innovative search dimension portfolios (i.e. S/H, B/H, S/M, B/M, S/L and B/L). We hold these 
portfolios over the next 12 months (July of year 𝑡𝑡 to June of year 𝑡𝑡 + 1) and compute the value-
weighted monthly returns of these six portfolios. We then calculate monthly size-adjusted 
returns of the low, middle and high portfolios using the formulas (S/L+B/L)/2 through to 
(S/H+B/H)/2. The “spread portfolio” return is calculated as the difference in returns between 
the high and low exploitation search focus portfolios. 
Table 4 shows that excess returns, calculated as the average monthly size-adjusted return 
less the one-month Treasury bill rate, increases monotonically with exploitation search focus. 
For example, using Internal Search Proximity (see Panel A.1), the excess returns for the low, 
middle and high portfolios are 0.58%, 0.76% and 0.86% respectively with the return spread of 
0.28% per month between the high and the low portfolio significant at the 1% level. 
We next examine whether the size-adjusted returns of the innovative search dimension 
portfolios can be captured by standard risk factor models. In particular, we perform time-series 
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regressions of the portfolios’ excess returns on the Fama-French three factors (the market factor 
MKT, the size factor SMB and the value factor HML) as well as Carhart’s (1997) momentum 
MOM factor. We also report the alphas (in percentage terms) estimated from other commonly 
used risk factor models as a robustness check. For example, we augment the Fama-French three-
factor model with the robust-minus-weak (RMW) profitability factor and the conservative-
minus-aggressive (CMA) investment factor in Fama & French (2015), the innovative efficient-
minus-inefficient (EMI) factor (Hirshleifer et al., 2013), as well as the liquidity (LIQ) factor in 
Pastor & Stambaugh (2003). Lastly, we consider existing mispricing-based factor models, 
augmenting the Fama-French three-factor model with the undervalued-minus-overvalued 
(UMO) factor of Hirshleifer & Jiang (2010) as well as reporting the alphas from the Mispricing 
factor model of Stambaugh & Yuan (2017). 
Table 4 shows that the risk-adjusted returns of the exploitation search focus portfolios 
increase monotonically with a firm’s greater focus on exploitation relative to exploration. For 
example, the risk-adjusted monthly returns of the high-minus-low portfolio formed using 
Internal Search Proximity typically ranges from 0.28% to 0.40% and are usually significant at 
the 1% level. Importantly, since these portfolios are only rebalanced once a year and do not 
comprise small illiquid firms as shown in Table 1, these abnormal returns are unlikely to be 
nullified by typical trading costs.  
In terms of noteworthy spread portfolio risk factor loadings (not reported in Table 4 for 
brevity), the significantly negative SMB loading and significantly positive CMA loading are 
consistent with the results in Table 1 that illustrate that high exploitation firms are generally 
bigger and undertake higher levels of investment. The significantly negative loading on the 
market factor indicates that high exploitation firms have lower market risk than high exploration 
firms while the significantly positive loading on the EMI factor suggests that high exploitation 
firms are more efficient in their R&D endeavors.  This is consistent with an exploitation search 
strategy, which prefers refinement of opportunities already identified by the firm, relative to the 
exploration of enticing but less understood possibilities. While exploration may increase the 
chances of a breakthrough change in a firm’s innovation trajectory, an explorative search 
strategy also fails more often and seems to result in a less R&D efficient search strategy on 
average. Finally, the significant positive loading of high exploitation firms on the UMO factor 
of Hirshleifer & Jiang (2010) provides further support for the conjecture that the return spread 
between high and low exploitation-focused firms is driven more by mispricing (arising from 
the undervaluation of exploitative innovation by the market) as opposed to systemic risk. 
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Nevertheless, our patent-based measures of firms’ innovative search focus appear to provide 
statistically and economically significant incremental explanatory power for observed stock 
returns above and beyond previously studied risk and mispricing factors.  
We also consider the time-series variation in spread portfolio returns over our 1982 to 2008 
sample period. Figure 1 shows the return on the spread portfolio of high exploitation minus low 
exploitation focused firms (using Internal Search Proximity and Exploitative Patent Ratio 
respectively) as well as the market factor returns (MKT) from 1982 to 2008 (where we annualize 
the six month returns for 1982 and 2008). There are three noteworthy observations. First, the 
annual returns on both high-minus-low portfolios are positive in at least two-thirds of the 
sample years, have less than half the return volatility of the market factor and appear to offer a 
hedge against market downturns (for example, the correlation of annual returns between the 
Exploitative Patent Ratio spread portfolio and the market factor is -0.35). Second, the ex post 
annual Sharpe ratio for the high-minus-low exploitation search focus portfolio compares 
favorably to commonly used risk factors. For example, based on the Exploitative Patent Ratio, 
the spread portfolio’s Sharpe ratio of 0.45 is above that of SMB (0.08), CMA (0.33) and HML 
(0.34) and is comparable to the Sharpe ratio of the market factor (0.47) and RMW (0.57). 
Finally, our aggregate abnormal return patterns appear to persist across our entire sample 
period. In particular, when we split our sample in half and compare portfolio performance, we 
find that spread portfolio returns are abnormally high and statistically significant in both halves 
of our sample (untabulated). 
 To further understand our return predictability results, Figure 2 plots the alphas of the high-
minus-low exploitation search focus spread portfolio over the three years post portfolio 
formation for the Cahart and Fama & French five-factor models. Interestingly, the market 
appears to fully correct the undervaluation of high exploitation firms in the first year after 
portfolio formation. This is consistent with the earnings surprise evidence in Section 3.2 
whereby investors initially under-estimate the beneficial impact of exploitative patents on 
future firm profitability and then quickly incorporate this unexpected positive news into its 
future earnings projections. While we do not conclusively rule out the possibility of risk-based 
explanations for our portfolio sort results, the observed pattern of stock price correction over 
relatively short time periods appears to be more indicative of mispricing-based return 
predictability rather than risk-based return predictability, consistent with the arguments in 
Chamber, Jennings & Thompson (2002) and Hirshleifer et al. (2018). 
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As a final robustness check, we use finer portfolio sorts to examine the monotonicity of our 
previously documented results. In particular, we independently sort firms into quintiles based 
on their exploitation search focus scores as well as two size groups based on the NYSE median 
size breakpoint. The spread portfolio return is calculated as the difference in returns between 
the size-adjusted returns of Quintile 5 (high exploitation search focus portfolios) and Quintile 
1 (low exploitation search focus portfolios). The results in Appendix 2 indicate that our prior 
portfolio sort results do not appear to be solely driven by extreme portfolios since the risk-
adjusted returns of the exploitation search focus portfolios increase in a reasonably monotonic 
manner across the five quintile portfolios, irrespective of whether Internal Search Proximity or 
Exploitative Patent Ratio is used as the sorting variable. 
Overall, these portfolio results imply that high exploitation firms are undervalued relative 
to high exploration firms and that this return differential is incremental to risk, mispricing and 
innovation-based pricing factors examined in the prior literature. 
4.2. Fama-Macbeth regressions 
Using monthly Fama-Macbeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions, we examine the ability 
of a firm’s innovation search strategy (characterized as the choice between exploitation vis-a-
vis exploration) to predict cross-sectional stock returns. The advantage of this method is that it 
permits the inclusion of a comprehensive set of firm-level controls to ensure that the positive 
exploitation-return relation in the portfolio sorts analysis is not driven by other known return 
predictors or industry effects. 
Following Fama & French (1992), for each month from July of year 𝑡𝑡 to June of year 𝑡𝑡+1 
we regress monthly returns of individual stocks (net of the one-month Treasury bill rate) on a 
firm’s exploitation search focus score and other control variables at year 𝑡𝑡 − 1.9 The control 
variables that we include in our regression specifications, namely Size, BTM, Momentum, short-
term reversal (ST reversal, defined as the previous month’s stock return), CapEx, R&D, Patents, 
Innovative Efficiency (IE), Innovative Originality (IO), Firm Age, Conglomerate, Total Patent 
Stock, Advertising, SG&A, Illiquidity, Leverage, ROE, Inst. Own, NS, IV and SKEW, are defined 
in Table 1. As in section 4.1, we winsorize all independent variables at the 1% and 99% levels 
and we standardize all independent variables to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation 
of one. 
                                                          
9 Using the lagged values of the independent variables ensures that all accounting and patent-based measures are 
fully observable to the public prior to the return estimation period (Fama & French, 1992). 
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We report the time series average slopes (in percentage terms) and the corresponding 
heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics from the monthly cross-sectional regressions in Table 5. In 
all specifications, the coefficient on exploitation search focus is significantly positive, ranging 
from 6 to 9 basis points per month. At least in terms of short-term stock returns, this implies 
that firms focused on the exploitation of their existing known competencies tend to significantly 
outperform firms pursuing innovations in fields that are more distant from the firm’s existing 
knowledge set. The economic magnitude of this effect is noteworthy since a one standard 
deviation increase in a firm’s Internal Search Proximity score increases the firm’s annual stock 
returns by approximately 1.0%. 
The coefficients on the control variables are in general consistent with the prior literature, 
whereby firms with a higher book-to-market ratio, higher ROE, lower net stock issuance and 
higher institutional ownership provide significantly higher future stock returns. Furthermore, 
the importance of the persistence and mean reversion in stock returns is evident in the positive 
coefficient on momentum and the negative coefficient on short-term reversal. 
Overall, consistent with the notion that higher than expected profitability drives higher near-
term stock returns, the return predictive ability of our exploitation search focus measures is 
distinct from and robust to the inclusion of other commonly researched return predictors and 
innovation-based variables as well as general industry effects. 
4.3. Innovative search focus, limited attention and future earnings surprises 
In this sub-section, we seek to directly test whether our results with respect to the 
undervaluation of exploitative innovation strategies is stronger in situations where cognitive 
biases, such as limited investor attention, may be more severe. To perform these tests, we use 
subsample Fama-Macbeth regressions whereby we run separate Fama-Macbeth regressions 
within sub-samples split by alternative proxies for investor attention, following the method in 
Hsu, Li, Teoh & Tseng (2018) and Hirshleifer et al. (2013). We also include all previously 
discussed controls for other well-known return predictors. For brevity, we only report the time 
series average slopes on Exploitation Search Focus (using either Internal Search Proximity or 
Exploitative Patent Ratio) and corresponding t-statistics from these subsample regressions. 
We use two commonly used proxies for the level of investor attention given to a particular 
stock or firm. First, firms with lower advertising expenditures are less likely to be as visible or 
familiar to both individual and institutional investors (Grullon et al., 2004; Lou, 2014), resulting 
in investors tending to pay less attention to these firms’ new patents and innovative search 
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strategies (Hsu et al., 2018). Thus, we split our sample into those firms that spend relatively 
more or less on advertising (using the median scaled advertising expense ratio as the break 
point), where we expect greater return predictability among less well known firms with lower 
advertising expenditures. Second, we use the classification scheme developed by Bushee (1998, 
2001) to categorize all institutional investors into transient investors, dedicated investors or 
quasi indexers. As argued in Bushee (1998) and Hirshleifer et al. (2018), transient institutional 
investors trade stocks based on strong-term strategies (e.g. momentum) and are thus less likely 
to pay as much attention to firms’ fundamentals as long-term-orientated dedicated institutional 
investors. Thus, we partition our sample into those firms that have a relatively higher proportion 
of shares held by less attentive transient institutional investors (as a percentage of total shares 
outstanding) compared to those firms with relatively lower levels of ownership by transient 
institutional investors, based on the median of transient institutional investors’ ownership.  
Table 6 presents the results of the Fama-Macbeth regressions within subsamples split by 
our two measures of investor attention, namely advertising intensity and the proportion of a 
firm’s equity held by transient institutional investors. Even after controlling for well-known 
return predictors and industry effects, it is clear from this analysis that how accurately the 
market values a firm’s innovation search strategy differs depending on the level of investor 
attention dedicated to that firm. For example, in Panel A, the slope on Exploitative Patent Ratio 
for low advertising firms is 0.07% (t-stat = 2.37) while, in contrast, the corresponding slope for 
high advertising firms is statistically indistinguishable from zero at 0.03% (t-stat = 0.61). 
Similarly, in Panel B, the slope on Exploitative Patent Ratio for firms with higher levels of 
transient institutional investor ownership (and thus subject to less institutional investor 
attention) is 0.09% (t-stat = 1.98) while the corresponding slope for firms with lower levels of 
transient institutional investor ownership is insignificantly different from zero at 0.02% (t-stat 
= 0.67). The magnitude of the difference between the ‘low’ versus ‘high’ investor attention sub-
sample coefficients in Panels A and B are economically substantial and usually statistically 
significant across various specifications (unreported results). Therefore, the contrasting results 
in this sub-sample analysis tend to support the hypothesis that limited investor attention 
explains the ability of exploitation search focus to predict future abnormal stock returns. 
Another possible and related behavioral explanation for our return predictability results is 
that the significant underpricing of exploitative innovation is driven by “investor distraction” 
(see Hirshleifer et al., 2009, in the context of earnings announcements). Under this theory, 
investor efforts to discern a firm’s innovative search strategy from its patenting activities and 
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to understand its implications for future profitability can be hampered by “extraneous news 
events” (for example, too many patents granted to other firms) that draw attention toward other 
firms. To evaluate this potential channel, we identify groups of firms that are more likely to be 
subject to “attention crowding-out” by computing the total number of new patents granted in 
year 𝑡𝑡 to all publicly listed companies in the same Fama-French 48 industry classification as 
the focal firm and then dividing this figure by the average number of patents granted each year 
to firms in the same industry as the focal firm over the past 5 years. The intuition behind this 
“industry patenting intensity ratio” is that in years where the focal firm’s industry group has an 
‘abnormally’ high number of patent grants, it is more likely that the attention paid by investors 
to the nuances and value implications of the focal firm’s innovative search strategy will be 
diminished (due to greater competition for finite investor attention). Using this ratio, we split 
our sample of firms each year into ‘high’ and ‘low’ groups based on the median value of this 
industry-level patenting intensity ratio. Interestingly, we do not observe a significant difference 
in the coefficients on our exploitation search focus measures in the High versus the Low 
Industry Patenting Intensity Ratio sub-groups (see Table 6, Panel C). Therefore, the combined 
evidence in this sub-section suggests that the observed positive exploitation-stock return 
relationship is primarily driven by investors and equity analysts in general devoting insufficient 
time and effort to understanding the earnings implications of a firm’s chosen innovative search 
strategy rather than equity investors only undervaluing exploitative search strategies when they 
are “overwhelmed” or “distracted” by abnormally high volumes of patenting activity by other 
firms. 
In order to further examine the mechanism driving our empirical results, we consider the 
extent to which the return predictability generated by a firm’s relative focus on exploitative 
rather than explorative innovation is driven by the under-reaction of stock market investors to 
future cash flows news. Specifically, we re-run the Fama-Macbeth regressions discussed in 
Section 4.2 but add both lagged earnings surprises as well as future earnings surprises to our 
list of right hand side return predictors. Lagged earnings surprise is defined as the cumulative 
annual earnings surprise in the year prior to portfolio formation (see Table 3 for further details 
on the computation of quarterly earnings surprise) while future earnings surprise represents the 
cumulative annual earnings surprise in the year after portfolio formation (we note that this is 
obviously information that is not observable by investors at time 𝑡𝑡). 
Appendix 3 reports the regression results. Unsurprisingly, one-period ahead stock returns 
are substantially higher for firms who have positive future earnings surprises. Furthermore, it 
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is interesting to note that the addition of future earnings surprise to our list of return predictors 
significantly attenuates the relationship between exploitation search focus and future stock 
returns. This implies that a large amount of the observed return predictability in this paper 
appears to be driven by investors and equity analysts failing to fully incorporate the beneficial 
impact of exploitative innovation into their initial short-term cash flow forecasts and then 
subsequently observing exploitative firms exceed these earnings projections, resulting in 
abnormally high subsequent stock returns for exploitation-focused innovative firms. 
4.4. Potential alternative explanations 
While the evidence in Section 4.3 suggests that limited investor attention is the key driver 
of our return predictability results, we nevertheless consider whether there are alternative risk-
based explanations for our findings beyond those risk factors explicitly controlled for in the 
portfolio sort and Fama-Macbeth regression analyses.  
One possible risk-based explanation for our results is that our exploitative search focus 
measures capture information asymmetry and/or valuation uncertainty (Hsu et al., 2018). 
However, both Internal Search Proximity and Exploitative Patent Ratio have low correlations 
with standard proxies for information asymmetry such as analyst earnings forecast dispersion 
and financial statement opacity, indicating that informational uncertainties are unlikely to be 
the primary cause of our return predictability results. 
Another potential explanation for our results is that companies pursuing an exploitative 
innovation search strategy are more reliant on the application of existing knowledge and are 
thus more exposed to systematic risk. For example, Pastor & Veronesi (2009) argue that during 
“technological revolutions” (e.g. the Internet Revolution and the 1830-1861 American 
Railroads Revolution), the nature of the uncertainty regarding the average productivity of a new 
technology may change from an idiosyncratic risk to a systematic risk. Relatedly, firms 
pursuing an exploitative innovation search strategy may be viewed as repeating old protection 
technologies and are thus subject to priced obsolescence risk.  
However, it is important to note that our sample covers firms operating in many different 
industries (43 out of the 48 Fama-French industries are represented in our sample) that span 
multiple decades and economic cycles (1982 to 2008). In contrast to the rare “technological 
revolutions” considered in Pastor & Veronesi (2009), it would seem more appropriate to 
classify the risk borne by individual firms in our sample that focus on the exploitation of known 
technologies as idiosyncratic and diversifiable risk. Notably, as shown in Table 5, the inclusion 
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of idiosyncratic firm volatility as an additional return predictor in our Fama-Macbeth 
regressions has virtually no impact on the positive relationship between Exploitation Search 
Focus and future stock returns. 
Furthermore, if firms’ differing reliance on known knowledge is the risk-based driver of the 
observed exploitation search focus-return predictability relationship, one would expect that 
firms that more frequently use older, more widely known technologies as the basis for their 
current inventions would be at much greater risk of their technology/knowledge base becoming 
obsolete sooner (Ma, 2018; Machlup, 1962). As such, we construct two proxies for the potential 
risk of obsolescence: (1) average age of prior art and (2) the average number of scientific 
references/citations made per newly granted patent.10 Average age of prior art is calculated as 
the average age of patents cited by the firm’s newly granted patents (where age is defined as 
the difference between the year that the cited patent was granted and the year that the citing 
patent was granted) (Fleming & Sorenson, 2004; Sorensen & Stuart, 2000). Average number 
of scientific references is computed as the mean number of citations made by a firm’s patents 
to prior scientific publications.11 Importantly, when we include average age of prior art and/or 
average number of scientific references as additional return predictors in our Fama-Macbeth 
stock return regressions (untabulated), we find that the significantly positive coefficients on our 
two measures of Exploitation Search Focus are virtually identical to the coefficient estimates 
reported in Table 5. This is consistent with the fact that the correlation between our measures 
of exploitative search focus and both proxies for obsolescence risk is relatively low. This 
evidence suggests that the risk of overreliance on known knowledge and/or obsolescence risk 
cannot explain the strong positive relationship between exploitative innovative search strategies 
and future stock returns. 
Finally, if exploitative firms were exposed to a persistent “technological revolutions” or 
“obsolescence” risk factor, it is difficult to reconcile this conjecture with the fact that: (a) the 
market seems to frequently underestimate the future near-term cash flows of exploitative firms 
(see the results in Table 3), (b) the market appears to fully correct the undervaluation of high 
exploitation firms in the first year after portfolio formation once the positive earnings surprises 
                                                          
10 The rationale behind this second measure is that since peer-reviewed scientific journal publications are widely 
available and relied upon by both academic researchers and industry professionals (Fleming & Sorenson, 2004), 
it is plausible that a greater reliance on this codified and published knowledge may increase the risk that a firm’s 
knowledge base becomes obsolete faster due to more intensive (and possibly competing) research in that field. 
11 Following the prior literature (e.g. Trajtenberg, Henderson & Jaffe, 1997), we use the number of non-patent 
citations as our measure of ‘scientific’ references. We thank the Berkeley Fung Institute of Engineering Leadership 
for providing the scientific citation data. 
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are observed (see Figure 2) and (c) the exploitation-return predictability relationship is much 
stronger in sub-samples of firms with greater investor inattention (see Table 6). 
Nevertheless, while we believe that the totality of the evidence presented in this paper 
suggests that our return predictability results are primarily attributable to behavioral biases 
whereby investors pay insufficient attention to the significant value generated by exploitative 
innovation, we acknowledge that it is impossible to completely rule out all potential risk-based 
explanations for our findings.   
Before continuing, it is important to consider the limits to arbitrage that result in high 
exploitation search focus stocks being (at least initially) significantly undervalued. There are 
several factors that may drive this phenomenon. First, numerous studies such as ours have 
demonstrated that the equity market tends to undervalue information contained in patent-based 
measures about future firm fundamentals (e.g. Hirshleifer et al, 2013; Hirshleifer et al., 2018). 
Given that the analysis and evaluation of patent value is a complex task that often requires 
specialist product market expertise, it seems reasonable to believe that investors may devote 
insufficient attention to understanding less salient exploitative innovations in favor of focusing 
on more noticeable explorative innovations (see, for example, the Andrx Corporation case study 
discussed in Appendix 1). Second, it is well documented that even institutional investors appear 
to have limited information processing capacity (e.g. Hirshleifer et al., 2009; Cohen & Frazzini, 
2008) and exhibit bounded rationality in their trading decisions (Coval & Shumway, 2005; 
Frazzini, 2006). Given that we show in Table 3 and Appendix 1 that equity analysts who are 
dedicated to covering only a small number of companies and enjoy greater access to firm 
management consistently struggle to accurately forecast the near-term cash flows generated by 
exploitation-focused firms, it seems plausible that even more sophisticated institutional 
investors (particularly more transient ones) will also fail to immediately impound the valuable 
information contained in a firm’s innovation search strategy into traded stock prices.  
 
5. Conclusion 
How innovation impacts a firm’s future earnings is difficult to predict, particularly for 
investors with limited attention and bounded cognition. We focus on how accurately investors 
can assess the impact of a firm’s internal innovation search strategy on its stock market 
valuation. We find that firms that exploit extant technologies close to the firm’s existing 
technological specialties (‘exploitation’ focused firms) tend to generate superior subsequent 
operating performance, relative to those firms that explore for new opportunities outside of the 
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firm’s existing knowledge base (‘exploration’ focused firms). Equity analysts do not appear to 
detect this phenomenon, as firms currently focused on exploitation tend to significantly 
outperform the market’s near-term earnings expectations. The stock market similarly fails to 
immediately incorporate all information about a firm’s innovative search strategy. We find that 
exploitation focused firms are undervalued relative to exploration focused firms and that this 
return differential is incremental to standard risk and innovation-based pricing factors examined 
in the prior literature. Furthermore, we find that our return predictability results are much 
stronger amongst groups of firms that are likely to receive less investor attention. 
We interpret our work as building on the growing literature examining the relationship 
between firm innovation and public equity markets (Lerner & Seru, 2017; Hirshleifer et al., 
2013; Cohen et al., 2013). One would expect exploitation strategies to correlate with R&D 
productivity and past success. If the argument for the riskiness of exploration holds, it would 
be surprising if an exploration search strategy proved more productive in patenting, as one 
would expect an increase in unsuccessful research efforts. Similarly, if one assumes that search 
requires learning and adjustment of organizational routines and development processes, one 
would also be surprised if search resulted in immediately greater R&D productivity (it might 
well subsequently result in greater labor productivity or higher overall productivity although 
those are topics beyond the scope of this paper). Similarly, one should not automatically expect 
firms that follow exploration search strategies to be more successful, on average, than those 
that follow exploitation strategies.  Indeed, the hope of exploration is that the strategy finds a 
new vein of rich payoff and that the firm can then mine those payoffs in the future with an 
exploitation strategy. At some point, however, exploitation veins run out and a firm must search 
for new opportunities (Levinthal & March, 1981; Levinthal & March, 1993). Therefore, while 
we present evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the market (at least in the short-term) 
undervalues firms that are engaged in the exploitation of their existing technologies, it would 
be incorrect to characterize our results as demonstrating that exploration-focused search 
strategies are not beneficial for corporations to pursue. 
Our return predictability results have significant implications for optimal firm financing 
policy and corporate disclosure policy in relation to a firm’s innovative activities.  
With respect to firm financing policy, the relatively short-term undervaluation of high 
exploitation firms relative to high exploration firms by public equity markets (see discussion in 
Section 4.1) implies that corporate executives may need to adjust their mix of project financing 
choices depending on the type of innovation search strategy being pursued. In particular, if a 
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firm is following an innovation exploitation search strategy, then value-maximizing firm 
managers will prefer to use cash and/or issue debt rather than issue underpriced equity securities 
to fund R&D operations. Thus, as advocated in He & Tian (2018), our results speak to the broad 
and relatively unexplored question of how corporate innovation affects a firm’s financial 
performance and policies.    
With respect to corporate disclosure policy, our results highlight the need for companies 
focusing on innovative exploitation to provide greater investor guidance as to the beneficial 
earnings impact, particularly in the short-term, of exploitative patents. Indeed, as shown in 
Section 3.2, even relatively sophisticated equity analysts seem to struggle to quantify the 
significant short-term earnings potential and thus overall value inherent in exploitative patents. 
Given studies such as Haggard, Martin & Pereira (2008) who find that increased corporate 
disclosure leads to an increase in a firm’s stock price informativeness, exploitation-focused 
firms would appear to have the most to gain from detailing the incremental value of new patents 
granted within the firm’s pre-existing areas of technological expertise. 
Finally, our empirical findings have important implications for the market valuation of 
exploitative and explorative innovation search strategies. 
First, our results point to a more nuanced view of the belief that firms respond to short-term 
earnings pressures by underinvesting in fundamental research, possibly decreasing the number 
of patents, breakthroughs, and overall innovative output (Dechow & Sloan 1991; Bushee 1998; 
Arora, Belenzon & Patacconi, 2018). The argument is that stock market pressure hampers 
innovation, due to short term pressures for performance (Stein 1989; Ferreira, Manso, & Silva 
2014). Our paper suggests that the market’s feedback effects on innovation might depend on 
the type of innovation. If exploitative efforts are given overly low attention and value, firms 
might surprisingly be biased towards exploratory innovation rather than exploitation. This 
would be consistent with increased private investment in fundamental research and 
development (Mervis, 2017). Relatedly, if explorative efforts were positively related to socially 
beneficial knowledge spillovers (the social value of innovations) and negatively related to 
business stealing effects (Bloom, Schankerman & Van Reenen, 2013), then the relative lack of 
attention given to exploitative innovations by investors might well turn out to be economically 
beneficial. 
Second, our results have implications for the interpretation of research findings that rely on 
firms’ patent counts as an outcome measure or explanatory variable (Lerner & Seru, 2017). 
Since patent portfolios that are of exploitative nature seem to be systematically undervalued, 
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the relation between patent counts and market value based measures like Tobins’ Q will be 
biased as well and vary according to whether the underlying portfolio reflects an exploitative 
or explorative strategy. In unreported regressions of patent portfolio values (based on Kogan et 
al., 2017 data) on our innovation search measures, for instance, we find that the average value 
of a patent increases with increased focus on exploitation and declines with increased focus on 
exploration.  
Third, our proposed mechanisms rely heavily on the assumption that an investor has limited 
attention and that s/he focuses on the impact of explorative rather than exploitative patents. One 
of our proposed mechanisms assumes that firms (with or without a conscious understanding of 
the mechanism) manipulate the focus of investor attention, for example, by highlighting certain 
types of innovation. This assumption could be tested empirically, by comparing the measure of 
a published patent portfolio with respect to innovation strategy, relative to a firm’s media 
strategy (for example, how often, to what extent, and for which types of patents, is the 
publication of a grant announced or commented upon by the firm). While our comparison of 
the extent of mispricing observed for low advertising firms versus high advertising firms in 
Table 6 strongly suggests that investor inattention is an important channel through which the 
stock market fails to properly value firms’ different innovative search strategies, it would 
nevertheless be interesting to use more granular data to assess how corporate disclosures with 
respect to exploitative versus explorative innovation affect investor perception of their 
respective value. For example, the effectiveness of a firm’s media strategy could be gauged, 
along with the technology and inventor communities’ reactions, through an analysis of social 
media. The differences across types of innovation and how they are publicized and perceived 
might reveal additional mismatches in valuation and performance. This line of reasoning could 
be extended to a more granular level and build on recent work that predicts the value of a 
particular patent based on stock market reaction (Kogan et al., 2017). We leave these and many 
other related questions to future research. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
At the end of June of year t, we sort firms into three groups (low, middle and high) based on the 30th and 
70th percentile of our exploitation focus measures, Internal search proximity and Exploitative patent ratio, 
in year t-1 (where low and high values are classified as firms focused more on exploration and exploitation 
respectively) (see Section 2.2 for further details on the construction of these two measures). The portfolios 
are formed every year from 1982 to 2007. Panel A reports the average annual number of firms and pooled 
median characteristics of each of the three groups. Size is the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
price per share times the number of shares outstanding at the end of June of year t. The book-to-market equity 
ratio (BTM) is the ratio of book equity of fiscal year ending in year t-1 to market equity at the end of year t-
1. CapEx is capital expenditure in fiscal year t-1 divided by lagged total assets. R&D is R&D expenditure in 
fiscal year t-1 divided by lagged total assets. Patents is the number of patents granted to the firm in year t-1 
divided by lagged total assets. Firm Age is defined as the number of years that a firm is listed on Compustat. 
Conglomerate is a dummy variable equaling one when a firm has segments with positive assets and sales in 
more than one 3-digit SIC code industry during the year. Total Patent Stock is the number of all patents 
granted to the firm up to year 𝑡𝑡 scaled by lagged total assets. Advertising is advertising expense scaled by 
lagged total assets. SG&A is selling, general & administrative expense divided by lagged total assets. 
Momentum is the prior 6 month returns (with one month gap between the holding period and the current 
month). Return on assets (ROA) is defined as income before extraordinary items plus interest expenses scaled 
by lagged total assets. Return on equity (ROE) is defined as income before extraordinary items divided by 
lagged shareholder’s equity. Operating Cash Flow (OCF) is calculated as income before extraordinary items 
plus depreciation less changes in working capital (defined as changes in current assets minus changes in 
current liabilities plus changes in short term debt and minus changes in cash) scaled by lagged total assets. 
Net stock issues (NS) is the change in the natural log of the split-adjusted shares outstanding. Split-adjusted 
shares outstanding is Compustat shares outstanding times the Compustat adjustment factor. Institutional 
ownership (Inst. Own) denotes the fraction of firm shares outstanding owned by institutional investors. 
Illiquidity is the absolute monthly stock return divided by monthly dollar trading volume in June of year t as 
in Amihud (2002) (the raw value has been multiplied by 1,000,000 for presentation purposes). Leverage is 
defined as total debt divided by total assets. Idiosyncratic volatility (IV) is measured at the end of June of 
year t as the standard deviation of the residuals from regressing daily stock returns on the Fama-French three 
factor returns over the previous 12 months with a minimum of 31 trading days following Hirshleifer et al. 
(2018). Total Skewness (SKEW) is calculated at the end of June of year t using daily returns over the prior 
12 months with a minimum of 31 trading days. Innovative efficiency (IE) is the patent citations-based measure 
developed in Hirshleifer et al. (2013). Innovative Originality (IO) is defined as the average patent citation 
diversity across all patents granted to the firm over the past five years following Hirshleifer et al. (2018). 
Panel B reports the Pearson correlation coefficients between selected variables with p-values reported in 
parentheses. 
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Panel A: Firm characteristics 
 Internal search proximity  Exploitative patent ratio 
Variable Low Middle High  Low Middle High 
Number of firms 306 406 306  383 322 314 
Internal search proximity 0.00 0.62 0.94  0.00 0.71 0.83 
Exploitative patent ratio 0.00 0.40 0.61  0.00 0.40 0.88 
Size (millions of dollars) 146.3 411.3 530.0  143.8 769.4 336.0 
BTM 0.49 0.49 0.42  0.52 0.46 0.42 
Capex 0.05 0.05 0.05  0.05 0.05 0.05 
R&D 0.03 0.04 0.06  0.03 0.05 0.05 
Patents 0.01 0.02 0.03  0.01 0.02 0.02 
Firm Age 11.0 14.0 13.0  11.0 15.0 13.0 
Conglomerate 0.30 0.41 0.33  0.31 0.41 0.35 
Total Patent Stock 0.04 0.07 0.10  0.04 0.07 0.11 
Advertising 0.02 0.02 0.02  0.02 0.02 0.02 
SG&A 0.33 0.29 0.31  0.33 0.28 0.31 
Momentum 0.07 0.09 0.09  0.08 0.08 0.09 
ROA 0.06 0.07 0.07  0.06 0.07 0.07 
ROE 0.08 0.10 0.11  0.09 0.11 0.10 
OCF 0.06 0.08 0.08  0.06 0.08 0.08 
NS 0.01 0.01 0.01  0.01 0.01 0.01 
Inst. Own 0.31 0.41 0.36  0.31 0.44 0.38 
Illiquidity 0.47 0.15 0.10  0.49 0.16 0.17 
Leverage 0.16 0.18 0.16  0.16 0.18 0.16 
IV 0.03 0.02 0.03  0.03 0.02 0.03 
IE 0.03 0.18 0.24  0.04 0.17 0.29 
IO 5.75 5.67 5.17  5.20 5.61 5.86 
 
Panel B: Correlation matrix  
Variable Internal search prox. 
Exploitative 
patent ratio 
Size BTM Patents R&D ROA IE IO 
Internal  
search prox. 
1.00 
 
        
Exploitative 
patent ratio 
0.51 
(0.00) 
1.00        
Size 0.13 
(0.00) 
0.10 
(0.00) 
1.00       
BTM -0.10 
(0.00) 
-0.13 
(0.00) 
-0.08 
(0.00) 
1.00      
Patents 0.06 
(0.00) 
0.08 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.00) 
-0.10 
(0.00) 
1.00     
R&D 0.04 
(0.00) 
0.09 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.05) 
-0.21 
(0.00) 
0.32 
(0.00) 
1.00    
ROA 0.04 
(0.00) 
-0.06 
(0.00) 
0.06 
(0.00) 
0.04 
(0.00) 
-0.18 
(0.00) 
-0.53 
(0.00) 
1.00   
IE 0.02 
(0.01) 
0.03 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.41) 
-0.01 
(0.14) 
0.04 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.81) 
1.00  
IO -0.01 
(0.28) 
0.10 
(0.00) 
0.09 
(0.00) 
-0.08 
(0.00) 
0.26 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.38) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.20 
(0.00) 
1.00 
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Table 2: Innovative search focus and future operating performance 
This table reports average slopes (in %) and t-statistics (corrected for heteroscedasticity & serial correlation 
using the Newey-West correction, 12 lags) from annual Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions 
of profitability in year t+1 on exploitation search focus and other controls in year t from 1981 to 2006. 
Profitability equals either return on assets (ROA), computed as income before extraordinary items plus 
interest expenses scaled by lagged total assets, or Operating Cash Flow (OCF), defined as income before 
extraordinary items plus depreciation less changes in working capital (defined as changes in current assets 
minus changes in current liabilities plus changes in short term debt and minus changes in cash) scaled by 
lagged assets. The measure of a firm’s focus on exploitative innovation in columns (1) and (2) is internal 
search proximity while in columns (3) and (4) it is exploitative patent ratio. ∆ROA and ∆OCF is the change 
in ROA and OCF between year t and year t–1 respectively. BTM, CapEx, R&D, Patents, Leverage, IE, IO, 
Firm Age, Conglomerate, Total Patent Stock, Advertising and SG&A are defined in Table 1. All regressions 
include industry dummies based on Fama-French (1997) 48 industries. We winsorize all variables at the 1% 
and 99% levels and standardize independent variables to have zero mean and one standard deviation. Average 
R2 is the time-series average of R2 from the annual cross-sectional regressions. 
 Internal search proximity  Exploitative patent ratio 
Profitability ROA (Next year) 
OCF 
(Next year)  
ROA 
(Next year) 
OCF 
(Next year) 
Exploitation search focus 0.45 
(5.14) 
0.49 
(7.90)  
0.16 
(2.79) 
0.15 
(2.18) 
BTM 0.14 
(0.34) 
0.14 
(0.38)  
0.14 
(0.34) 
0.13 
(0.34) 
CapEx 0.52 
(1.13) 
0.76 
(3.75)  
0.55 
(1.20) 
0.78 
(3.66) 
R&D -0.22 
(-0.53) 
-1.34 
(-7.88)  
-0.16 
(-0.38) 
-1.28 
(-7.57) 
Patents -0.59 
(-4.26) 
-0.79 
(-9.31)  
-0.58 
(-4.61) 
-0.78 
(-9.98) 
Leverage 0.07 
(0.32) 
0.67 
(2.48)  
0.08 
(0.36) 
0.69 
(2.59) 
IE 0.23 
(1.33) 
0.17 
(2.51)  
0.25 
(1.41) 
0.21 
(2.80) 
IO -0.26 
(-1.36) 
-0.23 
(-1.57)  
-0.32 
(-1.64) 
-0.18 
(-1.45) 
Firm Age 1.06 
(5.19) 
0.71 
(8.50)  
1.13 
(5.46) 
0.78 
(9.99) 
Conglomerate -0.17 
(-1.68) 
0.01 
(0.06)  
-0.16 
(-1.69) 
0.01 
(0.11) 
Total Patent Stock -0.43 
(-1.13) 
-0.20 
(-1.05)  
-0.40 
(-1.04) 
-0.17 
(-0.82) 
Advertising 0.18 
(3.82) 
0.07 
(0.86)  
0.22 
(4.51) 
0.10 
(1.25) 
SG&A 1.28 
(2.43) 
1.30 
(3.19)  
1.18 
(2.32) 
1.24 
(3.02) 
ROA 16.20 
(7.37) 
  16.26 (7.33) 
 
∆ROA -2.57 
(-6.18) 
  -2.56 (-6.08) 
 
OCF  13.54 
(6.01)  
 13.61 
(5.88) 
∆OCF  -4.32 
(-12.09)  
 -4.34 
(-11.87) 
Constant 1.36 
(0.50) 
2.41 
(0.83)  
1.25 
(0.46) 
2.22 
(0.77) 
Average R2 0.59 0.51  0.58 0.50 
  
 
 
40 
 
Table 3: Innovative search focus and earnings surprise 
This table presents quarterly Fama-Macbeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions of earnings surprise in each 
of the four quarters in year 𝑡𝑡+1 on a firm’s exploitation search focus in year 𝑡𝑡 and other controls from 1983 
to 2006. Following So (2013), quarterly earnings surprise equals the realized difference between actual 
earnings per share (EPS) and the consensus EPS forecast in I/B/E/S scaled by total assets per share. 
Exploitation search focus, BTM, R&D, Patents, CapEx, Leverage, IE, IO, Firm Age, Conglomerate, Total 
Patent Stock, Advertising, SG&A and ROA are defined in Table 1. Momentum is the prior 6 month stock 
return leading up to the earnings announcement (with one month gap between the holding period and 
announcement month). Accruals equal total accruals scaled by lagged assets (Sloan, 1996). Negative EPS is 
an indicator for whether the consensus EPS forecast for that quarter is negative (Fama & French, 2006). We 
include last quarter’s realized earnings surprise for firm 𝑖𝑖 (Lagged ES) and the change in earnings surprise 
between the prior two quarters (∆ES). We include industry dummies based on the Fama-French 48 industry 
classification scheme, winsorize all variables at the 1% and 99% levels and standardize independent variables 
to have zero mean and one standard deviation. Average R2 is the time-series average of the R2 from quarterly 
cross-sectional regressions. Newey-West autocorrelation-adjusted heteroscedasticity-robust t-stats are 
reported in parentheses. 
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 Internal search proximity  Exploitative patent ratio 
Dependent variable EPS surprise EPS surprise  EPS surprise EPS surprise 
Exploitation search focus 0.04 
(2.84) 
0.04 
(3.91) 
 0.02 
(3.73) 
0.02 
(3.04) 
Lagged ES 0.39 
(11.02) 
0.39 
(11.68) 
 0.38 
(8.81) 
0.40 
(12.30) 
∆ES -0.15 
(-4.96) 
-0.13 
(-3.31) 
 -0.15 
(-5.23) 
-0.14 
(-4.62) 
ROA 0.16 
(3.57) 
0.10 
(3.36) 
 0.15 
(3.73) 
0.09 
(3.74) 
Negative EPS -0.11 
(-1.92) 
-0.10 
(-1.63) 
 -0.11 
(-1.95) 
-0.08 
(-1.14) 
Accruals -0.06 
(-3.97) 
-0.07 
(-2.27) 
 -0.05 
(-4.16) 
-0.08 
(-1.99) 
BTM -0.02 
(-0.91) 
-0.06 
(-1.27) 
 -0.02 
(-0.86) 
-0.06 
(-1.28) 
Momentum 0.07 
(6.42) 
0.08 
(3.61) 
 0.07 
(5.29) 
0.09 
(2.98) 
Firm Age 0.02 
(1.13) 
0.07 
(1.47) 
 0.04 
(2.59) 
0.09 
(1.41) 
Conglomerate 0.03 
(1.53) 
0.01 
(0.81) 
 0.03 
(1.48) 
-0.01 
(-0.53) 
Total Patent Stock -0.01 
(-2.10) 
-0.03 
(-1.39) 
 -0.01 
(-0.62) 
-0.04 
(-1.44) 
Advertising -0.01 
(-0.85) 
0.01 
(0.45) 
 -0.01 
(-0.92) 
0.01 
(0.41) 
SG&A -0.01 
(-0.40) 
0.04 
(1.13) 
 -0.01 
(-0.32) 
0.03 
(1.04) 
R&D  -0.02 
(-0.66) 
  -0.02 
(-0.52) 
Patents  -0.03 
(-2.04) 
  -0.03 
(-1.73) 
CapEx  0.03 
(1.09) 
  0.02 
(0.94) 
Leverage  -0.09 
(-1.70) 
  -0.09 
(-1.62) 
IE  0.15 
(1.11) 
  0.17 
(1.10) 
IO  -0.04 
(-0.99) 
  -0.03 
(-1.27) 
Constant -0.22 
(-2.91) 
-0.10 
(-0.82) 
 -0.26 
(-3.04) 
-0.08 
(-0.49) 
Average R2 0.26 0.30  0.26 0.30 
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Table 4: Portfolio returns and risk factor models 
At the end of June of year t from 1982 to 2007, we sort firms independently into three groups (low [L], middle 
[M] or high [H]) based on the 30th and 70th percentiles of either a firm’s internal search proximity or 
exploitative patent ratio score in year t-1 and two size groups (small [S] or big [B]) based on the NYSE 
median size breakpoint at the end of June of year t. We hold these portfolios over the next 12 months and 
compute value-weighted monthly returns for each portfolio. We then calculate monthly size-adjusted returns 
of the three exploitation search focus portfolios as (S/L+B/L)/2, (S/M+B/M)/2 and (S/H+B/H)/2 respectively. 
We measure exploitation search focus by internal search proximity and exploitative patent ratio (as defined 
in Section 2.2) in Panels A and B respectively. The first half of each Panel reports the monthly average size-
adjusted excess returns to these portfolios in the first column (computed as the difference between size-
adjusted portfolio returns and the one-month Treasury bill rate, expressed in percentage terms) while the 
remaining columns report the alphas (𝛼𝛼, expressed in percentage terms) from regressing the time-series of 
portfolio excess returns on various factor returns. The second half of each Panel reports the associated 
adjusted R2 for each time-series regression. All returns and alphas reported are value-weighted while 
heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are provided in parentheses. MKT, SMB and HML are the market, size 
and book-to-market ratio factors of the Fama & French (1993) three-factor model (3F) whilst MOM is the 
momentum factor developed by Carhart (1997). RMW and CMA are the robust-minus-weak factor and the 
conservative-minus-aggressive factors in Fama & French (2015). EMI is the innovative efficient-minus-
inefficient factor in Hirshleifer et al., 2013). LIQ is the liquidity factor defined in Pastor & Stambaugh (2003). 
UMO is the undervalued-minus-overvalued factor of Hirshleifer & Jiang (2010). We also report the alpha 
from the Mispricing factor model of Stambaugh & Yuan (2017). 
Panel A: Portfolio sorts based on internal search proximity 
Panel A.1 – Excess returns and alphas from different factor models 
   3F plus  
Portfolio Exret 3F MOM RMW+CMA EMI LIQ UMO Mispricing 
Low 
   t-stat 
0.58 
(1.79) 
-0.16 
(-1.35) 
-0.03 
(-0.33) 
-0.02 
(-0.15) 
-0.12 
(-1.01) 
-0.17 
(-1.46) 
0.02 
(0.21) 
-0.00 
(-0.20) 
Middle 
   t-stat 
0.76 
(2.57) 
-0.02 
(-0.21) 
0.08 
(1.21) 
0.02 
(0.14) 
-0.03 
(-0.38) 
-0.02 
(-0.22) 
0.07 
(0.61) 
0.08 
(0.76) 
High 
   t-stat 
0.86 
(2.86) 
0.22 
(2.43) 
0.26 
(2.58) 
0.26 
(2.82) 
0.17 
(1.93) 
0.22 
(2.45) 
0.22 
(2.51) 
0.22 
(2.43) 
High-Low 
   t-stat 
0.28 
(2.81) 
0.38 
(3.58) 
0.29 
(2.66) 
0.28 
(2.46) 
0.30 
(3.03) 
0.40 
(3.69) 
0.20 
(1.71) 
0.22 
(2.01) 
 
Panel A.2 – R2 of different factor models 
   3F plus  
Portfolio  3F MOM RMW+CMA EMI LIQ UMO Mispricing 
Low  0.89 0.92 0.90 0.89 0.89 0.91 0.90 
Middle  0.91 0.94 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.93 0.93 
High  0.92 0.94 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.93 0.92 
High-Low  0.17 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.17 0.21 0.15 
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Panel B: Portfolio sorts based on exploitative patent ratio 
Panel B.1 – Excess returns and alphas from different factor models 
   3F plus  
Portfolio Exret 3F MOM RMW+CMA EMI LIQ UMO Mispricing 
Low 
   t-stat 
0.58 
(1.83) 
-0.13 
(-1.15) 
-0.02 
(-0.60) 
0.00 
(0.04) 
-0.10 
(-0.78) 
-0.16 
(-1.40) 
0.00 
(0.16) 
-0.06 
(-0.70) 
Middle 
   t-stat 
0.84 
(2.69) 
0.08 
(0.90) 
0.11 
(1.13) 
0.14 
(1.38) 
0.03 
(0.32) 
0.09 
(0.98) 
0.11 
(1.36) 
-0.04 
(-0.40) 
High 
   t-stat 
0.85 
(3.10) 
0.21 
(2.54) 
0.19 
(1.99) 
0.21 
(2.50) 
0.18 
(2.20) 
0.22 
(2.68) 
0.18 
(2.03) 
0.15 
(1.68) 
High-Low 
   t-stat 
0.27 
(2.63) 
0.34 
(3.39) 
0.21 
(2.08) 
0.20 
(1.96) 
0.28 
(2.83) 
0.39 
(3.89) 
0.18 
(1.67) 
0.21 
(2.16) 
 
Panel B.2 – R2 of different factor models 
   3F plus  
Portfolio  3F MOM RMW+CMA EMI LIQ UMO Mispricing 
Low  0.88 0.93 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.89 
Middle  0.92 0.94 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 
High  0.92 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.91 
High-Low  0.15 0.24 0.26 0.23 0.17 0.22 0.23 
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Table 5: Innovative search focus and future stock returns 
This table reports the average slopes (in %) and their associated Newey-West (1987) autocorrelation-adjusted 
heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics (with 12 lags) from Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions 
of individual monthly stock returns from July of year t to June of year t+1 on exploitation search focus 
(defined as internal search proximity and exploitative patent ratio in year 𝑡𝑡-1 for columns (1)-(2) and (3)-(4) 
respectively) and other control variables. Size, BTM, ROE, CapEx, R&D, Patents, NS, Inst. Own, Illiquidity, 
Leverage, IV, SKEW, IE, IO, Firm Age, Conglomerate, Total Patent Stock, Advertising and SG&A are defined 
in Table 1. Momentum is the prior 6 month returns (with one month gap between the holding period and the 
current month). ST reversal is the previous month’s stock return. All regressions include industry dummies 
based on the Fama & French (1997) 48 industry classification scheme. We winsorize all variables at the 1% 
and 99% levels and standardize all independent variables to zero mean and one standard deviation. Average 
R2 is the time-series average of the R2 from the monthly cross-sectional regressions. The stock return data 
are from July 1982 to June 2008. 
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 Internal search proximity  Exploitative patent ratio 
Dependent variable Monthly stock return 
Monthly stock 
return  
Monthly stock 
return 
Monthly stock 
return 
Exploitation search focus 0.08 
(2.27) 
0.09 
(2.15) 
 0.06 
(2.02) 
0.06 
(1.71) 
Size -0.08 
(-0.69) 
-0.16 
(-1.38) 
 -0.06 
(-0.48) 
-0.13 
(-1.09) 
BTM 0.30 
(3.87) 
0.28 
(3.36) 
 0.31 
(3.98) 
0.30 
(3.47) 
Momentum 0.19 
(2.34) 
0.18 
(2.30) 
 0.19 
(2.39) 
0.19 
(2.29) 
ST reversal -0.82 
(-8.69) 
-0.89 
(-8.85) 
 -0.84 
(-8.68) 
-0.88 
(-8.82) 
R&D 0.06 
(0.48) 
0.12 
(1.02) 
 0.06 
(0.48) 
0.12 
(1.05) 
Patents -0.13 
(-3.15) 
-0.14 
(-3.10) 
 -0.12 
(-2.91) 
-0.12 
(-2.83) 
CapEx -0.08 
(-1.01) 
-0.06 
(-0.57) 
 -0.08 
(-1.05) 
-0.07 
(-0.59) 
ROE 0.18 
(2.84) 
0.13 
(1.87) 
 0.17 
(2.98) 
0.12 
(1.82) 
Firm Age 0.04 
(0.61) 
-0.00 
(-0.08) 
 0.05 
(0.66) 
0.00 
(0.04) 
Conglomerate -0.00 
(-0.02) 
0.02 
(0.22) 
 -0.01 
(-0.15) 
0.01 
(0.11) 
Total Patent Stock 0.08 
(1.98) 
0.06 
(1.23) 
 0.08 
(2.02) 
0.06 
(1.20) 
Advertising 0.02 
(0.35) 
0.00 
(0.04) 
 0.02 
(0.37) 
0.00 
(0.03) 
SG&A 0.03 
(0.34) 
0.07 
(0.69) 
 0.03 
(0.32) 
0.07 
(0.72) 
IE  0.04 
(1.24) 
  0.05 
(1.33) 
IO  0.07 
(1.39) 
  0.05 
(1.06) 
Illiquidity  0.20 
(1.46) 
  0.19 
(1.40) 
Leverage  0.03 
(0.47) 
  0.04 
(0.63) 
NS  -0.24 
(-3.07) 
  -0.25 
(-3.17) 
Inst. Own  0.14 
(3.27) 
  0.15 
(3.65) 
IV  -0.05 
(-0.28) 
  -0.04 
(-0.26) 
SKEW  -0.09 
(-1.85) 
  -0.10 
(-1.89) 
Constant 1.01 
(2.36) 
0.73 
(1.53) 
 0.98 
(2.31) 
0.71 
(1.49) 
Average R2 0.14 0.18  0.14 0.17 
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Table 6: Innovative search focus, investor attention & future stock returns: subsample analysis 
This table reports the average slopes (in %) and their associated Newey-West (1987) autocorrelation-adjusted 
heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics (with 12 lags) from Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions 
of individual monthly stock returns from July of year t to June of year 𝑡𝑡+1 on exploitation search focus 
(defined as internal search proximity and exploitative patent ratio in year 𝑡𝑡-1 for columns (1)-(2) and (3)-(4) 
respectively) and other control variables. Panel A separates firms into two subsamples depending on whether 
they have below or above median scaled advertising expenditure (Low Advertising and High Advertising, 
respectively). Panel B separates firms into two subsamples depending on whether the ownership percentage 
of transient institutional investors, following the classification in Bushee (2001), is above or below the 
relevant median value (High Transient Institutions and Low Transient Institutions, respectively). Panel C 
splits firms into two subsamples depending on whether a firm is operating in an industry sector with above 
or below median industry patenting intensity ratio (High Industry Patenting Intensity Ratio and Low Industry 
Patenting Intensity Ratio). Industry patenting intensity ratio is defined as the total number of new patents 
granted in year 𝑡𝑡 to all publicly listed firms in the same Fama-French (1997) 48 industry classification as the 
focal firm divided by the average number of patents granted each year to firms in the same industry as the 
focal firm over the past 5 years. Low ATT denotes groups of stocks with relatively lower investor attention 
(i.e. Low Advertising and High Transient Institutions) while High ATT denotes groups of stocks with 
relatively higher investor attention (i.e. High Advertising and Low Transient Institutions). High DISTRACT 
represents groups of firms that are more likely to be subject to the effects of “investor distraction” (i.e. firm 
years with a High Industry Patenting Intensity Ratio) while Low DISTRACT represents groups of firms that 
are less likely to be subject to the effects of “investor distraction” (i.e. firm years with a Low Industry 
Patenting Intensity Ratio). Other controls comprise Size, BTM, ROE, CapEx, R&D, Patents, NS, Inst. Own, 
Illiquidity, Leverage, IV, SKEW, IE, IO, Firm Age, Conglomerate, Total Patent Stock, Advertising and SG&A 
which are defined in Table 1 as well as Momentum (defined as the prior 6 month returns with one month gap 
between the holding period and the current month) and ST reversal (defined as the previous month’s stock 
return). All regressions include industry dummies based on the Fama & French (1997) 48 industry 
classification scheme. We winsorize all variables at the 1% and 99% levels and standardize all independent 
variables to zero mean and one standard deviation. Average R2 is the time-series average of the R2 from the 
monthly cross-sectional regressions. The stock return data are from July 1982 to June 2008. 
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Panel A: Subsamples split by the intensity of advertising expenditure 
 Internal search proximity  Exploitative patent ratio 
Subsample 
Low 
Advertising 
(Low ATT) 
High 
Advertising 
(High ATT) 
 
Low 
Advertising 
(Low ATT) 
High 
Advertising 
(High ATT) 
Exploitation search focus 0.07 
(2.07) 
0.04 
(0.87) 
 0.07 
(2.37) 
0.03 
(0.61) 
Other Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry FEs Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Average R2 0.23 0.29  0.23 0.28 
 
Panel B: Subsamples split by the proportion of transient institutional investors 
 Internal search proximity  Exploitative patent ratio 
Subsample 
High Transient 
Institutions 
(Low ATT) 
Low Transient 
Institutions 
(High ATT) 
 
High Transient 
Institutions 
(Low ATT) 
Low Transient 
Institutions 
(High ATT) 
Exploitation search focus 0.09 
(1.77) 
0.04 
(0.79) 
 0.09 
(1.98) 
0.02 
(0.67) 
Other Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry FEs Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Average R2 0.29 0.22  0.28 0.22 
 
Panel C: Subsamples split by industry patenting intensity ratio 
 Internal search proximity  Exploitative patent ratio 
Subsample 
High Industry 
Patenting Intensity 
Ratio 
(High DISTRACT) 
Low Industry 
Patenting Intensity 
Ratio 
(Low DISTRACT) 
 
High Industry 
Patenting Intensity 
Ratio 
(High DISTRACT) 
Low Industry 
Patenting 
Intensity Ratio 
(Low DISTRACT) 
Exploitation 
search focus 
0.07 
(1.67) 
0.05 
(1.37) 
 0.06 
(1.94) 
0.06 
(1.85) 
Other Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry FEs Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Average R2 0.21 0.24  0.21 0.25 
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Figure 1: Innovative search focus and market factor returns (1982-2008) 
This figure plots the return on the spread portfolio of high exploitation minus low exploitation focused firms 
(using internal search proximity and exploitative patent ratio respectively) and the market factor returns 
(MKT) from 1982 to 2008 (where we annualize the observed six month returns for 1982 and 2008).  
 
 
  
-30%
-20%
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
Exploitation search focus - factor returns
MKT Internal search proximity Exploitative patent ratio
 
 
49 
 
Figure 2: Monthly average alphas of High-minus-Low exploitation search focus spread portfolio 
over the 3 years post portfolio formation 
This figure plots the monthly average alphas for the High-minus-Low exploitation search focus spread 
portfolio (formed using internal search proximity and exploitative patent ratio as described in Section 4.1) 
over the three post-sorting years. The portfolio alphas shown are calculated using either the Cahart four-
factor model or the Fama & French five-factor model (see Section 4.1 for further details).  
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Appendix 1: Case study - Andrx Corporation 
In this appendix, we provide the example case study of Andrx Corporation, a U.S. specialty 
drug delivery and distribution company, to: (a) outline the numerical calculation of our two 
measures of a firm’s exploitation search focus (Internal Search Proximity and Exploitative 
Patent Ratio), (b) describe how these measures differ from previously studied innovation-
related variables (in particular the innovative originality and innovative efficiency measures 
developed in Hirshleifer et al. (2018) and Hirshleifer et al. (2013) respectively) and (c) illustrate 
how limited investor attention can drive the observed positive relationship between exploitative 
innovative search strategies and future stock returns. 
Description of Andrx Corporation: 
In 1992, pharmacist Alan P. Cohen founded Andrx Corporation with the goal of working 
with brand-name pharmaceutical companies to develop generic products using the company’s 
proprietary oral timed-release drug delivery technologies. In particular, Andrx developed oral 
drug delivery technology that could be used to (a) improve the dosage release characteristics of 
existing drugs (e.g. instead of a patient taking several doses of medication each day, a patient 
could take a single timed-release dose that would automatically produce the desired effects 
throughout the day) and (b) develop bioequivalent formulations of products for which the 
pharmacokinetic profile is difficult to replicate. This sustained drug delivery transformation had 
the advantage of improving patience compliance, decreasing side effects, providing greater 
convenience to the patient and even enhancing drug efficacy. Furthermore, these costly and 
more difficult-to-duplicate single dose formulations had the ability to extend product life cycles 
and serve as barriers to entry by generic competitors. This in turn offered Andrx the opportunity 
to capture higher profit margins on its exploitative innovations: 
“These complex, controlled-release generics will hold some of the most lucrative profit 
margins for the generic drug industry and Andrx in particular, whom we believe can sustain 
gross margins in excess of 70%.” 
- CIBC Oppenheimer Equity Research Report, 21 April 1998 
In addition, many market analysts noted that Andrx Corporation could exploit its core complex 
generic formulation expertise to incrementally improve the delivery characteristics of many 
related drug products: 
“Andrx has developed and applied six drug delivery technologies in the area of oral solid-
dose controlled-release drug products. Andrx’s patents will likely serve the same function 
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as those of patents issued to [New Drug Application focused] companies. Although each 
technology was developed to address a particular drug problem, we believe the technology 
is flexible enough to be applied to any number of products.” 
- UBS Dillon Reed Equity Research Report, 17 March 1997 
Andrx Corporation completed its initial public offering (IPO) in June 1996 at $12.00 per share 
with an implied market capitalization of approximately $200 million. 
Calculation of Exploitation Search Focus measures: 
We now use the patenting history of Andrx Corporation to describe how our two measures 
of Exploitation Search Focus, namely Internal Search Proximity and Exploitative Patent Ratio, 
are computed from 1997 to 1999. Table A1 documents the raw values (which can take on values 
between zero and one) and percentile ranks of Andrx Corporation’s Internal Search Proximity 
and Exploitative Patent Ratio scores for the years 1997 to 1999. We show the detailed 
calculations for 1999 as an example of the procedure that we follow. 
Table A1.1 – Exploitation Search Focus measures for Andrx Corporation (1997–1999) 
 Internal search proximity  Exploitative patent ratio 
 Raw value Percentile rank  Raw value Percentile rank 
1997 0.99 93  1.00 99 
1998 0.99 94  0.80 78 
1999 1.00 98  1.00 99 
 
Computation of Internal Search Proximity in 1999: 
In 1999, Andrx Corporation was granted two new U.S. patents, 5916595 and 5922352, 
where both patents had a primary USPTO technology class of 424 (Drug, bio-affecting and 
body treating compositions). Table A1.2 provides a comparison of the technology class 
distribution of the current year (1999) patent portfolio with the technology class distribution of 
the firm’s previously granted patents (pre-1999). 
Table A1.2 – Breakdown of Andrx Corporation’s patent portfolio by technology class 
Period Grant year Total number of 
patents granted 
Primary USPTO technology class 
(count of newly granted patents in a 
given class shown in brackets) 
Current (1999) 1999 2 424 (2) 
Past (Pre 1999) 1998 5 424 (5) 
 1997 1 424 (1) 
 1996 4 424 (3); 514 (1) 
 1995 5 424 (5) 
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As can be seen in Table A1.2, there is a very high degree of similarity or overlap between 
the technology classes covered by Andrx’s newly granted patent portfolio in 1999 (100% in 
technology class 424) and the technology classes spanned by Andrx’s previously issued patents 
(over 93% of the firm’s pre-1999 patents are also encompassed in technology class 424). Using 
the depreciation-adjusted Equation (1) in Section 2.2, we compute Andrx’s 1999 Internal 
Search Proximity score as 0.998. This is consistent with Andrx Corporation pursuing an 
exploitation innovation search strategy whereby a company focuses its current innovative 
activities on technological areas that are familiar to the firm. 
Computation of Exploitative Patent Ratio in 1999: 
In order to calculate Andrx Corp’s Exploitative Patent Ratio in 1999 (our alternative 
measure of a firm’s exploitation search focus), we first compute the “new cite ratio” for each 
of the two patents granted to Andrx Corporation in 1999. This is defined as the total number of 
citations made to “new knowledge” (i.e. patents not previously developed or cited by Andrx) 
divided by the total number of ‘back’ citations made by the patent. 
Table A1.3 – New knowledge cited by Andrx Corporation’s 1999 granted patents  
Patent number Total back citations Citations to ‘new knowledge’ New cite ratio 
5916595 12 7 58% 
5922352 44 2 5% 
Following Benner & Tushman (2002), a patent is flagged as “explorative” if at least 80% 
of its citations are based on new knowledge (new cite ratio ≥ 80%). Since the development of 
both of these new patents relied heavily on Andrx’s existing knowledge base such that both 
patents’ new cite ratios fell below the 80% threshold established by Benner & Tushman (2002) 
and followed in Ma (2018), Brav et al. (2018), Gao et al. (2018) and Lin et al. (2017), both of 
these patents are classified as ‘exploitative’ patents such that Andrx Corporation’s Exploitative 
Patent Ratio for 1999 is set equal to one.12 
Comparison with alternative innovation-related variables: 
In this subsection we consider how our two measures of a firm’s exploitation search focus 
(Internal Search Proximity and Exploitative Patent Ratio) compare to other innovation-related 
variables, namely innovative originality (Hirshleifer et al., 2018) and innovative efficiency 
(Hirshleifer et al., 2013). In order to facilitate the comparison of these four measures and to 
                                                          
12 We note that our empirical results are robust to simply sorting firms on their average new cite ratio or using 
alternative thresholds for identifying a patent as being “explorative.” 
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more directly compare the strength of the resulting trading signal, Figure A1.1 shows the 
percentile ranks of Andrx’s Internal Search Proximity, Exploitative Patent Ratio, Innovative 
Originality and patents-based Innovative Efficiency scores for each year from 1997 to 1999. 
Figure A1.1 – Percentile ranks of innovation-related measures for Andrx Corporation (1997-1999) 
 
One of the key takeaways from Figure A1.1 is that a firm’s internal innovative search 
strategy (characterized as the choice between exploitation versus exploration) can be quite 
distinct from the ‘originality’ of a firm’s patents as measured in Hirshleifer et al. (2018). For 
example, while both the Internal Search Proximity and Exploitative Patent Ratio measures 
clearly identify Andrx Corporation as pursuing an exploitation innovation search strategy (and 
thus a candidate to be included in the ‘long’ portfolio), the innovative originality of Andrx’s 
patents over this same time period is similar to the median publicly traded firm in the U.S. 
economy (and thus not offering a clear buy or sell signal for Andrx during this time period).  
As argued earlier in the Introduction and Section 2.3, we view Internal Search Proximity 
and the Exploitative Patent Ratio as being both conceptually and empirically distinct from 
Innovative Originality (IO) and Innovative Efficiency (IE). As shown in the case of Andrx, our 
focus on understanding the value-relevant information contained in examining a firm’s current 
innovative output relative to the past innovative output of the same firm (i.e. a firm’s internal 
focus on exploitative versus explorative innovation) is quite distinct from the question of how 
original or different a firm’s patents are relative to other firms. This is because a firm can create 
highly original/(unoriginal) patents while following existing/(new) research trajectories and 
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vice versa. The limited relationship that we observe between our Exploitation Search Focus 
measures and other innovation-related measures for Andrx Corp is consistent with the low 
correlations (<0.10) between our two measures of Exploitation Search Focus and both IO and 
IE in our full sample as well as with the unreported principal component analysis (available 
upon request) which finds that the innovative originality measure in Hall et al. (2001) does not 
load on either the ‘exploitation’ or the ‘exploration’ component. In any case, even after we 
include both IO and IE as controls in all of our subsequent empirical analysis, we find that both 
of our exploitation search focus measures continue to contain meaningfully incremental value-
relevant information. 
Limited investor attention and under-reaction to exploitative innovation strategy: 
Given that Andrx Corporation was following an exploitative innovation search strategy, a 
natural question to ask is how did equity analysts and the stock market in general assess and 
value this innovation search strategy?  
As discussed in Section 3.2, if the market fails to fully understand the positive impact of 
exploitative patents on future firm profitability due to limited investor attention, then we may 
observe more positive “earnings surprises” for exploitation-focused firms which may in turn 
result in these firms generating abnormally high future stock returns. In Figure A1.2 below, we 
plot the I/B/E/S consensus earnings per share (EPS) estimates as well as the realized EPS results 
(adjusted for stock splits) for Andrx Corp for each quarter between the third quarter (Q3) of 
1997 and Q3 2001. Interestingly, we find that actual EPS exceeded consensus EPS estimates 
for nine consecutive quarters between Q3 1998 and Q3 2000.    
Figure A1.2 – Actual EPS vs. consensus EPS estimates for Andrx Corporation (quarterly) 
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Over the multiple years that the realized profitability of Andrx Corporation exceeded the 
market’s earnings expectations, the market capitalization of the firm’s stock (shown in Figure 
A1.3) rose dramatically as the market incorporated higher earnings forecasts into its valuation 
of the company’s operations.   
Figure A1.3 – Market capitalization of Andrx Corporation (1996-2001) 
 
In this time period of consecutive positive earnings surprises, equity analysts covering 
Andrx Corporation noted several reasons for the consistent outperformance of Andrx’s 
exploitative innovative search strategy relative to their initial earnings expectations. As eluded 
to in a research note by Salomon Smith Barney on 23 June 1999, the overarching theme of this 
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commentary was the failure of the market to fully recognize the commercial potential of 
Andrx’s core proprietary technology. Specifically, 
“ADRX has an ongoing program geared toward improving the release profile of existing 
drugs. In our opinion, a significant portion of ADRX’s value will be driven by the strength 
of the technology platform, and realization of that commercial potential by the market 
should help drive the stock [emphasis added].” 
First, analysts noted that sales of Andrx’s first manufactured controlled release generic 
product Diltia XT/Dilacor XR (a once-daily formulation of diltiazem, a calcium channel blocker 
indicated for the treatment of chest pain (angina) and moderate hypertension) were significantly 
higher than initial market expectations. For example, a CIBC Oppenheimer equity research 
report released on 26 April 1999 stated that: 
“As in the previous quarter, strong sales of the company’s first manufactured controlled-
release drug, a generic equivalent of Watson Pharmaceuticals’ Dilacor XR, exceeded our 
[Q1 1999] estimate by nearly 50%, likely contributing at least $0.05 of the positive EPS 
surprise. [This was due to] Dilacor XR, the company’s first marketed controlled-release 
generic, capturing additional market share as substitution rates for the product also increase 
(i.e. increased share in a growing market).” 
Second, many analysts significantly underestimated the profitability of Andrx’s second 
manufactured controlled release generic product Cartia XT (a once-daily diltiazem calcium 
channel blocker product indicated for the treatment of high blood pressure and angina) which 
had further improvements in terms of pharmacokinetic profile and competitive positioning as 
Andrx learned from its first product launch and further refined its core technology platform. In 
particular, the market did not appear to appreciate how profitable the continued application of 
this core technology to related drugs could be for Andrx Corporation. For example, CIBC 
Oppenheimer said the following in its 28 July 1999 research report: 
“We reiterate our Strong Buy on the shares of ADRX after the release of record operating 
results for Q2 1999 that confirm our thesis that ADRX possesses some of the most 
substantial earnings leverage in the specialty pharmaceutical spectrum [emphasis added]. 
Andrx’s Cartia XT generic launch redefines Andrx’s pipeline potential. Andrx’s Cartia XT 
generic is off to the fastest start of any generic launch ever, we believe, currently capturing 
34% unit market share. The extraordinary launch performance of the company’s second 
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generic controlled release diltiazem hydrochloride was the catalyst for Andrx’s second-
quarter record results that blew past even the most optimistic projections. 
We had been using the sales ramp of Dilacor XR, Andrx’s first marketed product, as our 
baseline for estimating the potential of future Andrx pipeline launches. The impressive 
launch of Andrx’s first potential blockbuster Cartia XT clearly redefined the launch 
trajectory for the sales potential of Andrx’s controlled release pipeline.” 
Separately, Salomon Smith Barney in a research report dated 10 February 2000 stated that: 
“ADRX reported Q4 1999 EPS of $0.63, again beating consensus and our expectations [the 
company’s sixth consecutive upside earnings surprise]. Andrx had another strong 
quarter…powered by Cartia XT sales which drove the upside surprise. In our opinion, the 
company’s impressive drug delivery technology platform should provide the basis for 
sustainable long-term growth.” 
Overall, it is clear that both equity analysts and the stock market failed, at least initially, to 
recognize the potential profits that Andrx Corporation could generate from its strategy of 
exploiting its existing innovative capabilities to improve the release profile of existing drugs. 
However, as the commercial potential of the firm’s core drug delivery technology platform 
manifested itself in continual positive earnings surprises, the market price of Andrx increased 
substantially, thus generating abnormally high stock returns. 
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Appendix 2: Quintile sorts - portfolio returns from selected risk factor models 
At the end of June of year t from 1982 to 2007, we sort firms independently into five groups based on the 
20th, 40th, 60th and 80th percentiles of either a firm’s internal search proximity or exploitative patent ratio 
score in year t-1 and two size groups (small [S] or big [B]) based on the NYSE median size breakpoint at the 
end of June of year t. We hold these portfolios over the next 12 months and compute value-weighted monthly 
returns for each portfolio. We then calculate monthly size-adjusted returns of the five exploitation search 
focus portfolios in the same manner as Table 4. We measure exploitation search focus by internal search 
proximity and exploitative patent ratio (as defined in Section 2.2) in Panels A and B respectively. This table 
reports the monthly average size-adjusted excess returns to these portfolios in the first column of each Panel 
(computed as the difference between size-adjusted portfolio returns and the one-month Treasury bill rate, 
expressed in percentage terms) while the remaining columns of each Panel report the alphas (𝛼𝛼, expressed in 
percentage terms) from regressing the time-series of portfolio excess returns on various factor returns. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. MKT, SMB and HML are the market, size 
and book-to-market ratio factors of the Fama & French (1993) three-factor model (3F). RMW and CMA are 
the robust-minus-weak factor and the conservative-minus-aggressive factors in Fama & French (2015). LIQ 
is the liquidity factor developed in Pastor & Stambaugh (2003). 
  Internal search proximity  Exploitative patent ratio 
Portfolio  3F 3F+RMW+CMA 3F+LIQ  3F 3F+RMW+CMA 3F+LIQ 
1 (Lowest) 
   t-stat 
 -0.10 
(-0.79) 
-0.05 
(-0.39) 
-0.12 
(-0.92) 
 -0.12 
(-1.03) 
-0.08 
(-0.61) 
-0.15 
(-1.24) 
2 
   t-stat 
 -0.09 
(-0.80) 
-0.10 
(-0.83) 
-0.11 
(-0.94) 
 0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.03 
(-0.40) 
0.00 
(0.03) 
3  
   t-stat 
 0.03 
(0.30) 
-0.02 
(-0.17) 
0.03 
(0.31) 
 0.02 
(0.21) 
0.00 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.28) 
4 
   t-stat 
 0.05 
(0.54) 
0.02 
(0.22) 
0.06 
(0.55) 
 0.21 
(1.93) 
0.07 
(0.93) 
0.24 
(1.96) 
5 (Highest) 
   t-stat 
 0.22 
(2.07) 
0.19 
(1.76) 
0.23 
(2.14) 
 0.25 
(2.30) 
0.33 
(3.12) 
0.25 
(2.48) 
5 minus 1 
   t-stat 
 0.32 
(2.85) 
0.25 
(2.26) 
0.35 
(3.05) 
 0.37 
(2.80) 
0.41 
(2.63) 
0.40 
(3.16) 
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Appendix 3: Innovative search focus, return predictability and future earnings surprises
This table reports the average slopes (in %) and their associated Newey-West (1987) autocorrelation-adjusted 
heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics from Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions of individual 
monthly stock returns from July of year t to June of year t + 1 on exploitation search focus (defined as internal 
search proximity and exploitative patent ratio in year 𝑡𝑡-1 for columns (1)-(2) and (3)-(4) respectively) and 
other control variables. Lagged Earnings Surprise is defined as cumulative annual earnings surprise in the 
year prior to portfolio formation (see Table 3 for further details on the computation of quarterly earnings 
surprise). Future Earnings Surprise is calculated as the cumulative annual earnings surprise in the year after 
portfolio formation. Size, BTM, ROE, CapEx, R&D, Patents, NS, Inst. Own, Illiquidity, Leverage, IV, SKEW, 
IE, IO, Firm Age, Conglomerate, Total Patent Stock, Advertising and SG&A are defined in Table 1. 
Momentum is the prior 6 month returns (with one month gap between the holding period and the current 
month). ST reversal is the previous month’s stock return. All regressions include industry dummies based on 
the Fama & French (1997) 48 industry classification scheme. We winsorize all variables at the 1% and 99% 
levels and standardize all independent variables to zero mean and one standard deviation. Average R2 is the 
time-series average of the R2 from the monthly cross-sectional regressions. The stock return data are from 
July 1982 to June 2008. 
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 Internal search proximity  Exploitative patent ratio 
Dependent variable Monthly stock return 
Monthly stock 
return  
Monthly stock 
return 
Monthly stock 
return 
Exploitation search focus 0.09 
(1.74) 
0.08 
(1.42) 
 0.08 
(1.96) 
0.04 
(0.91) 
Lagged Earnings Surprise -0.04 
(-0.54) 
-0.00 
(-0.03) 
 -0.04 
(-0.58) 
-0.01 
(-0.15) 
Future Earnings Surprise 0.77 
(10.80) 
0.74 
(10.08) 
 0.77 
(10.73) 
0.73 
(10.00) 
Size -0.27 
(-1.83) 
-0.17 
(-1.14) 
 -0.24 
(-1.63) 
-0.14 
(-0.92) 
BTM 0.15 
(1.19) 
0.15 
(1.15) 
 0.17 
(1.30) 
0.16 
(1.19) 
Momentum -0.07 
(-0.72) 
-0.09 
(-0.90) 
 -0.07 
(-0.66) 
-0.09 
(-0.83) 
ST reversal -0.93 
(-6.80) 
-0.91 
(-6.59) 
 -0.92 
(-6.79) 
-0.92 
(-6.60) 
R&D 0.18 
(1.08) 
0.15 
(1.11) 
 0.19 
(1.14) 
0.16 
(1.18) 
Patents -0.11 
(-1.72) 
-0.09 
(-1.42) 
 -0.09 
(-1.37) 
-0.07 
(-1.08) 
CapEx -0.10 
(-1.05) 
-0.07 
(-0.64) 
 -0.11 
(-1.14) 
-0.07 
(-0.66) 
ROE 0.03 
(0.26) 
0.05 
(0.43) 
 0.02 
(0.17) 
0.05 
(0.43) 
Firm Age -0.05 
(-0.63) 
-0.03 
(-0.48) 
 -0.05 
(-0.59) 
-0.03 
(-0.41) 
Conglomerate 0.14 
(1.64) 
0.14 
(1.45) 
 0.12 
(1.39) 
0.13 
(1.29) 
Total Patent Stock 0.10 
(1.66) 
0.06 
(0.98) 
 0.08 
(1.32) 
0.05 
(0.79) 
Advertising 0.04 
(0.77) 
-0.02 
(-0.27) 
 0.05 
(0.80) 
-0.01 
(-0.22) 
SG&A -0.09 
(-0.49) 
-0.03 
(-0.16) 
 -0.10 
(-0.51) 
-0.04 
(-0.23) 
IE  0.03 
(0.57) 
  0.03 
(0.56) 
IO  0.07 
(1.01) 
  0.05 
(0.68) 
Illiquidity  -0.50 
(-1.05) 
  -0.56 
(-1.10) 
Leverage  0.05 
(0.56) 
  0.05 
(0.53) 
NS  -0.25 
(-2.41) 
  -0.26 
(-2.58) 
Inst. Own  0.05 
(1.03) 
  0.06 
(1.12) 
IV  0.61 
(1.93) 
  0.63 
(1.99) 
SKEW  -0.18 
(-3.48) 
  -0.17 
(-3.35) 
Constant 1.09 
(1.79) 
1.20 
(1.80) 
 1.11 
(1.87) 
1.21 
(1.75) 
Average R2 0.22 0.25  0.22 0.26 
 
